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THE WORLD PEACE AND AFTER

By
Carl H. Grabo

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



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PREFACE

The following pages were written in large part shortly after the entrance of the United States into the world war. The international ideals there expressed are such as many people the world over then held and have since come to hold with an increasing ardour of conviction. Only subsequently have some of these become specific issues of international diplomacy. To the idealists of Russia, to the British Labour Party, and to Woodrow Wilson do we owe the insistence upon honourable, frank, and enlightened dealing among nations, no less than among individuals, as fundamental to a just and lasting peace.

But though enlightened and magnanimous ideals of an enduring peace are now a part of the world's thought, a theme of daily discussion, unfortunately they are far from being universally accepted; nor are the enemies to them only those who combat them openly. Infinitely more dangerous is the secret opposition to them of a powerful class both at home and abroad. For these ideals are indirectly subversive of the old order; their implications are revolutionary. As I seek to demonstrate in this little book, their realization demands not only the construction

of a new diplomatic machinery; it demands also a social revolution—peaceful, perhaps, but radical—in each of our modern industrial states.

We witness now the initial stages of that revolution. The world war has long since ceased to be only a war between rival groups of states; it is a conflict of ideals. It has become a war of classes; war between the rights of persons and the rights of property. The powerful and propertied minorities the world over are being drawn together in a contest of survival waged with the masses, which, strong in numbers, are weak in organization, in leaders, in the tradition of authority, and have little control of the political and industrial machinery which has hitherto ruled the world. We are witness to the incipient stages of the last and greatest revolution, that by which the masses seek to wrest power from the bourgeoisie. Other revolutions in history have exacted power from kings and placed it in the hands of the nobility. These in turn have been largely merged with the commercial classes, and political and social power has shifted to the hands of those who control the wealth of the world. The revolution whose initial tremors we now discern but which may not be completed in our time is that which seeks to effect a still wider distribution of power: to place it truly where before it has been but ostensibly, in the hands of the people.

Predictions are doubtless hazardous at this time,

but I look to see the best and most immediate results of the revolution in England. The British Labour Party has organized itself into a political engine which gives promise of controlling English policy, foreign and domestic. It has a program and leaders. Its policy is far-seeing and genuinely revolutionary, but its methods promise to be bloodless and its conquests such as it can retain and solidify. What may occur in Russia no one can safely predict. It seems improbable that the old régime should ever be restored. On the other hand, the Bolsheviki seem to have before them an impossible task if they are to organize an industrial state truly controlled by the workers. The industrial condition in Russia has not sufficiently evolved to permit such control as yet; the masses are too ignorant; the leaders too few and visionary to cope with the immediate and tremendous economic problems. I look to see the restoration of political power in Russia to the hands of the moderate evolutionary Socialists, whose program will be to develop industrial machinery subject to state control and whose ultimate aim will be the complete absorption of this machinery by a socialized state when a better educated proletariat shall be fitted to rule.

France and the United States seem to me to offer the least immediate promise of wholesome and tangible results. France is a nation of peasant proprietors and small business men. The French Revolution was

a bourgeois revolution and France has been largely content with bourgeois control. The spirit of nationalism also is strong in France. Her silence upon the new internationalist ideals has been ominous. And we of this country have not found ourselves, do not know what we want, do not clearly realize what our true condition is. The warfare of capital and labour in the United States is still primitive. Our labouring classes have not yet become a political party realizing the necessity of a voice in national legislation. And vast numbers of our middle classes have not wakened as yet to their true condition, nor to their prospects in a society in which capital becomes daily more strongly intrenched.

In England one finds a more intelligent class consciousness than in the United States, more widespread thought upon political and social problems, so that despite hereditary class distinctions and other relics of an aristocratic past England bids fair to achieve a democracy which is industrial as well as political long before we in the United States have awakened fully to our true condition and to the changes needful to alter it.

The pinch of war may, however, do much. The President and a few intelligent leaders have already done much and may do more. And it is certain that the next few years will greatly accelerate the sluggish flow of our political and social thinking. Though in

many respects the most backward of the civilized peoples, our entrance into the world war and our consequent participation in world thought must inevitably modify our insularity, our provinciality. A participation in a world league for the maintenance of peace must lead us to consider those domestic evils whose destruction is essential if that peace is to be insured. We have, then, to consider the nature of our democracy and those obstacles which at present lie in the path to its better realization, a realization prerequisite to the assumption of our rightful place in a league of enlightened nations seeking to establish a world order more righteous, more enduring, more auspicious than this earth has yet seen.

THE WORLD PEACE AND AFTER

I

THE OPPORTUNITY OF THE PEACE

DURING the three years and more that the world war has already persisted, years with their daily record of horror, many a thoughtful and sensitive American has asked himself, Is life worth living in a world in which these things are possible? Pessimistic youth asks that question when crossed in love, but mature men and women, who have endured pain and sorrow, usually find in the interest and promise of life a justification of existence. Yet when this ghoulish thing, like some abhorred familiar from the savage youth of the world, leaped upon us from the shadows, we wondered whether life did indeed contain true promise or whether our civilization and our moral progress were only a sham. For we should be superficial and naïve were we to wash our hands of responsibility and lay the blame of this war solely

upon the Germans. Rather we should search our hearts and cry in the words of Christian fleeing the wrath to come, "What shall I do to be saved?"

"Salvation," however, no longer means to us of today individual redemption. The old narrow personal morality of the Puritans has become a social morality, and when we seek "salvation" we seek it as a people craving the right way for the world whereby social injustice and national rivalries and hatreds—and the wars which spring from these—may be done away with forever. We wish to see our duty more clearly than before, our goal as American citizens solicitous for our righteousness as a people. And above all we wish to see our obligations in the sisterhood of nations so that we may aid the world to realize its hope of international unity. Strangely enough, that hope persists today despite the war; it is even stronger than before, for what was once only an aspiration and a dream has become a vital and immediate necessity if civilization is to endure. Nor is this an inauspicious time to press for its realization. So great a change in the world's way of life demands for its inception intense emotion. This the war has brought. Mankind has been fired to a white heat; all our institutions, habits, and conventions lie plastic to our hand and we can refashion them in whatsoever forms it is our will to make. But we must strike while the metal is yet hot, before men and nations

have hardened into the old moulds of custom or the chance moulds of circumstance.

After the great fire of London in 1666, Sir Christopher Wren drew up plans for a finer city, one with wider and straighter streets, with open spaces for the admission of light and air, a nobler and fairer place in which men should dwell. But while he was endeavouring to secure sanction for his reforms and the necessary means and legislation, the old city grew up as before, with its crooked and narrow streets and its crowded noisome tenements. The regenerating fire was of no profit, for the seventeenth century Englishmen had not the energy and wisdom to turn their misfortune to good uses. The old evils sprang up again like mushrooms, and two centuries and more were to elapse before the slow pressure of social forces achieved a few of the benefits—and these at great cost—which a little idealism, energy, and foresight could have secured at a blow when London lay in ashes.

Much of our civilization both material and institutional lies in ashes today as the result of the great war. The choice is ours: to let the old evils with their ensuing certitudes of conflict and misery grow up as before, or to refashion civilization to finer, more ideal, uses. We lack neither leaders nor ideals. Much of the best thought of the world has pointed the way for us. The danger lies in delay.

If we wait until the old habits and beliefs bind us again, until the ardour of unselfishness has cooled, until the religious emotions stirred by bereavement have become torpid, and the spirit of sacrifice in life and goods has become again the spirit of gain and greed—then we must thereafter be content with the slow groping progress that emerges from the conflict of narrow and blind forces. We have today an opportunity such as no one of us will ever see again. It is ours to seize and mould the destinies of nations so that war will be forever impossible; and so to refashion the social order that justice and beauty may come to be where now are economic slavery and misery.

Were the whole of the civilized world to turn to the task of reconstruction with the ardour and courage which has animated the millions who have laid down their lives for a cause they thought just, our civilization could in a few years attain that place which under normal conditions it might not attain in a century. We revere the young men who die so willingly for The Cause. But what that Cause is and the certainty of its attainment we only can determine, we who survive, we who do not risk our lives in the trenches. To us is given the greatest opportunity in history to regenerate the world, for we have ideals and science such as did not exist at the peace of 1815 or at the conclusion of any world war comparable to

this. Should we refuse the opportunity, and by every delay, every failure to take thought, every compromise with our highest ideals, we shall refuse it, the strong young men will have given their lives for nothing. War in itself and the sacrifices of war are an unmixed evil. But it is the law of life that out of evil may come good, out of death life, out of a warring world the brotherhood of man—if we choose to have it so.

The task for the citizen is to think as clearly as he can and to feel as deeply and purely. Emotion indeed is there, much of it exalted emotion, for I believe the desire for good is more universal in the world today than ever before. No war has ever involved so great a part of mankind as this and in none comparably great has there been so much unselfish sacrifice for ideals, however mistaken some of these may be. But because of the very magnitude of the conflict and the diversity of aims of the peoples involved, because of the very complexity of the political, social, and economic problems evoked, we are bewildered by the magnitude of the task of a righteous settlement. We have to devise a world in which war shall be impossible, a question, it would seem, of international relations purely, of Hague courts, and an international police. Yet a moment's thought makes us aware that back of this machinery lie economic and social questions which must be met, and back of these,

religious and ethical ideals. The reorganization of the world for the destruction of war demands the reorganization of every nation, and within each nation the creation of finer and clearer ideals, individual and social, for each of its citizens.

The unity of the modern world for good or for evil is a self-evident fact. This is not a war of unmixed good clashing with unqualified evil. At its best, most ideally stated, it is a war of the democratic spirit upon a single form of autocracy, a form obvious because an anachronism. The Prussian military state is a relic of the eighteenth century, is indeed almost feudal in form and spirit. But commingled with its militarism is an industrial autocracy no worse in intent though better realized in execution than the industrial autocracy of all modern highly developed states. A potential industrial autocracy, one far on the road to complete realization, exists in England and in the United States. With us it is not so evident as that of Prussia, its carnage and its possibilities of evil not so spectacular as those of Prussia's armed legions.

In all states and in all times, today as yesterday, the conflict of the few and the many, of overlord and serf, of those who have and those who lack, of autocracy and democracy, persists. Out of this conflict spring wars and misery and the ills of this world. It will profit us little to crush militarism in Germany if we fail to recognize autocracy in England and

America and do not seek also to destroy it. In England and America, it is only fair to state, the opposing force of democratic idealism is still strong, is not yet subdued to any remorseless philosophy of the superman. Many of those who practice autocracy among us would fail to recognize and would disclaim it were it dignified as a political philosophy. "Business is business" is a charitable creed covering divers evil practices the theory of which will not bear the light of day. The warfare of capital and labour is only now clearly recognized as a war of classes. We justify it only on the ground of immediate necessity. We do not admit that wealth is justified in all the practices it may see fit to employ, nor that in the order of things some few must always be rich and the vast majority poor. In Germany we find the callous assumption that the majority are but cannon fodder to be sacrificed at the word of the few. The open declaration and justification of this philosophy revolts us.

The danger of German autocracy lies not so much in its avowed philosophy, which serves only to put other nations upon their guard and prompt them to its destruction, but in the efficiency which it has displayed, the loyalty which it commands, and the elements of good in it which have produced that loyalty. Its heartlessness has been in part compensated for by a better social order. The enslaved masses have en-

joyed benefits in many respects superior to those which the masses in England and America have enjoyed. Order, efficiency, education, comparative comfort, insurance against the evils of injury, sickness, and old age—all these have contributed to the content and loyalty of the German people, have made them blindly obedient and loyal to the commands of their superiors. And this very efficiency and loyalty constitute the menace of German autocracy to the freedom of the world. The rest of mankind have found autocracy in its political and industrial forms inefficient and productive of no good to them. They have turned, therefore, to democracy as their one hope, a democracy never as yet wholly successful because, perhaps, never given a thorough trial.

Democracy, a truer democracy, industrial as well as political, seems indeed the one hope of the world today. Politically, the people of Western Europe are becoming convinced, as Americans long ago were convinced, that the rule of kings and overlords is a failure. They have largely done away with them. But the expected gain to human freedom has not been fully realized, for power has but changed its form. In America autocracy is not the power of a landed nobility with hereditary privilege, but the might of wealth exerting an insistent though often hidden pressure upon our political institutions. We are on the way to the establishment of a power as great and as

dangerous to human liberty as that of Prussian militarism. The peace which we seek, international and permanent peace, will never be achieved until the power of wealth in the hands of industrial exploiters here and in England is democratized, passing from the hands of the few into the control of the many.

We have also to confront the task, until now never clearly or widely realized, of making democratic control of industry as efficient and as farsighted as autocratic government in its most successful instances has shown itself to be. It is a provocative fact that the relatively free and democratic powers, England, France, and the United States, have been able to meet the lesser might of the central empires upon something like equal terms only as they have adopted the methods of the enemy. In England and France virtual dictatorships have been established, that in England a coalition of the reactionary forces of the Empire. Popular control of government, such as it was, has been suspended in order that the war may be fought to a successful conclusion.

What, upon the establishment of peace, will be the domestic consequences of the centralization of power during war in each of the three great free peoples? Three possibilities suggest themselves:

(1) England, France, and the United States may return to the conditions which existed previous to the war, those of industrial competition only slightly

regulated by the state. The old *laissez faire* system, inefficient, wasteful, and unstable, may be re-established. But should this be the case we should have soon to face the likelihood of another conflict between the relatively unorganized and inefficient states and some power or group of powers autocratically directing the might of industry to the attainment of national ambitions—Germany's attempt, all but successful, in the present war. In such a conflict, if the opposing forces of autocracy are anything like the equal of those of democracy in wealth of men and natural resources, there can be but one conclusion. In the present war, the central empires with far fewer men and far poorer resources than those of the Allies, have by virtue of better industrial organization all but overpowered the world. In the light of the sacrifices which this war has exacted we dare not look forward to a repetition of the struggle.

(2) The second, the more likely, and by far the more dangerous possibility is that the democratic nations, having learned from the enemy the manifest advantage to industrial organization of autocratic control, may re-establish their governments after the peace upon a highly centralized basis not subject to the popular will. There will be a strong movement to this end. Industrial leaders in England and America, realizing the advantages of a strong central organization which shall fuse political and industrial

power, will seek to retain it, but subject to their control, not to that of the people. The economic advantages of such a centralization have been demonstrated. It makes for the elimination of waste and for swift and precise action. It offers, too, as in Germany, advantages to the worker in improved working and living conditions, more regular employment and at a fixed wage, better opportunity for education, a greater security. It offers what Germany has given her people. But if such industrial and efficient states, controlled by a class and not by the mass, should be established, and the possibility is far from negligible, the war of democracy will need to be fought again, not as a war between nations and groups of nations but a war of class with class the world over.

(3) A third possibility and, of all, the most difficult of attainment is that upon the realization of which the freedom and welfare of the world depend. It is the reorganization of modern states in such wise that industrial efficiency may be secured, but subject to democratic control: it requires the centralization of political and economic power undominated by any class, whether a bureaucracy, as in Germany, a landed nobility, as in England, or leaders of industry and finance, as in the United States. Democracy can survive this war only as it draws strength from the forces it seeks to overcome, learning the power and

efficiency of Germany whilst losing nothing of the freedom which it now has nor the power of attaining that greater freedom to which it aspires.

In the large impersonal view of nature, this war may seem but a contest for survival between two rival orders of life. Germany has displayed something of that organization, efficiency, and subordination of the individual to the purposes of the group which we marvel at in the colonies of ants and bees. The peoples of England and the United States, like the birds, are less gregarious, less able to co-ordinate numbers to an end and sacrifice the individual to a community purpose. But it does not follow that one only of the rival orders can survive and that the other must perish. Were they to continue side by side unmodified, this might be the case. They are not, however, distinct orders, but members of the same species, and supposedly high enough in the evolutionary scale to profit by experience and learn through imitation. Were they to fuse their seemingly opposed ideals of the state, a society might be constructed in which a highly centralized power, political and economic, would permit the utmost practicable degree of individual freedom. Such, at any rate, difficult as its attainment is, must be the aim of a reorganized world upon the conclusion of peace. Democracy, to survive as a working ideal and as a force sufficiently strong to combat autocracy whether

political or industrial, must profit by its failures in this war. Not otherwise can the danger of the rise to power of other states upon the German plan be discounted. States in which there exists no strong democratic ideal, as for instance Japan, may learn from the present war not that autocracy is dangerous to the liberties of men, but that autocracy, guiding a highly organized industrial system, is strong. Such a state may be deterred by no altruism, no passion for individual liberty, from the attainment of its imperial ambitions. Individual freedom and the increased power of the state: these two, however seemingly opposed, must be somehow reconciled one to the other. We must solve the paradox of a co-operative society which yet respects individual rights, in which the individual gives himself to the services of the state but retains his share of state control and receives in so doing a greater measure of freedom for the development of his powers, for self-realization, than he now possesses. To attempt the definition of such freedom is the purpose of this discussion.

II

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

We have so long been taught to think of the world in terms of states that it is only with a conscious and violent effort that we are able to detach ourselves from the glamour of patriotism, from the glories of emperors, kings, and presidents, from the rhapsodies of literature personifying the nation as a young and beautiful woman, and to look upon the state as it really is: its origin, its justification, its services, and its defects. In childhood we are given flags and guns; in the schools we learn of the Pilgrim Fathers, of George Washington, and Lincoln; and in maturity we read our nation's history or see it in the making. We contrast our customs, our virtues, our women with the like but inferior possessions of foreigners. And throughout all this educative process our minds are unconsciously warped to an artificial conception of the state. Our country is personified as Uncle Sam, a benevolent and shrewd old gentleman of rustic quaintness; or as Columbia, a deep-chested starry-eyed goddess emblematic of liberty. Our conception is a figure of speech, a poetic misrepresentation of

reality; and we are so constituted that it is all but impossible ever to see this reality with fresh and undistorted vision.

Yet the state is purely an artificial and in a sense an unreal creation, largely the product of fortuitous circumstance. It is merely a body of people occupying a certain portion of the earth's surface which has more or less sharply defined topographic barriers. This group of persons has a certain form of government, certain laws, traditions, literature, and speech which differentiate them from neighbouring groups on the other side of a river or sea or separated from them by so slight a barrier as a row of stone posts suitably engraved with coats of arms. States virtually are but families occupying adjacent properties which are visibly demarked by fences and hedges. Like families, too, races have slightly differing customs, differing tastes in food and dress, and differing conceptions of the duties of children to their elders. But the likenesses are far more remarkable than the dissimilarities. All are composed of men and women who love and aspire, work and play, beget and bear children, and in due time die and are buried with appropriate ceremonies. Differences even of race, apparent in the hue of skin, form of features, and colour of hair and eyes, are superficial only. To the surgeon laying bare the nerves and muscles of the body, and to

the poet laying bare the dreams and aspirations of the soul, men are alike the world over. The maxims of Confucius resemble the teachings of Christ, Balder is but another name for Apollo, and the cultured man of America or Russia turns to the plays of Sophocles or the aphorisms of Marcus Aurelius for spiritual consolation and enlightenment.

Why, then, are barriers erected between the various members of the human family and the hedges separating one group and another set with mantraps and pitfalls? The answer is to be found, of course, in the history of the human race. The barriers and the consequent hostility and hatred are inheritances of savagery and barbarism. The human race, pastoral or sea-going, spreading in groups over the surface of the earth, marked off each one as much land as it could defend from the encroachment of others, and within the boundaries so defined, developed laws and institutions peculiar to itself. As more land, access to the sea, or "a place in the sun" seemed desirable, a group warred with its neighbours and seized what it could or was driven back within its former boundaries. Much of human history is no more than the record of this ebb and flow of groups, their conquests and failures. It is a record of shifting frontiers and the consequent though minor implications of a varying culture, religion, and law.

So conceived, history seems little more than the

record of economic necessity or greed. And such it is in its larger outlines, which, however, are blurred by numerous secondary considerations. Man, though the victim of economic circumstance and lusting after the goods of this earth, is in his soul a theologian and poet. Wherever he may be forced to dwell he will evolve his notions of a deity and devise a ritual for worship, frame a philosophy, and speculate upon the meaning of life and the movements of the stars. And his thoughts and aspirations he will set forth in his poetry and his art. He will fashion a code of laws whereby justice, as he conceives it, may be secured. Gods and ceremonies, poetry and legal codes will, among peoples of somewhat equal culture, be much alike in substance, however various in form and nonessentials. The purpose of religion amongst all peoples is to know God, the ideal of art is to express the wonder and poignancy of life, and the aim of law and political institutions to secure justice and a peaceful life. These purposes are common to all peoples, and differ only in the means of their attainment.

Yet to realize this essential unity of all races and peoples is not, in practice, easy. Barriers of language and custom, hostility born of trivial differences in manners, and more than all else ignorance of history and comparative religion have until modern times bred intolerance and hatred. Even today, among

the most enlightened peoples, we cannot declare religious and social tolerance to be universal. But the *auto da fe* is gone and the *pogrom*, too, it may be, is a thing of the past. In English eyes all Frenchmen are no longer immoral, nor in French eyes all Americans avaricious money getters lacking an appreciation of philosophy and art. In these respects the world has grown less provincial of late and we can look forward hopefully to the complete eradication of such childish prejudices from enlightened peoples.

But these barriers between peoples are superficial and their removal, however much it may facilitate travel, agreeable intercourse, and the interchange of art, literature, and ideas, does not destroy the fundamental cause of the hostility among nations, which is economic. Economic pressure and the thirst for conquest have made the frontiers of states as we know them today. Economic barriers of tariffs, government subsidies, and export duties keep alive the fiction that races and nations are more different than alike. And the belief in national destiny, the right of a "superior" race to control the destinies of one deemed "inferior," and the trade rivalries of competing economic groups among nations, are still potent for future alliances, conquests, and wars, unless at this opportune moment for the establishment of a world order insuring peace, the root source of international hatreds is recognized and removed.

§ 2

The liberation of the small oppressed peoples—Belgium, Servia, and Poland—is now one of the declared objects of the Allies in pursuing the war to a successful conclusion. Whatever political and economic factors determined the original alignment of nations, however much England's concern for the independence and security of Servia and Belgium was at first due to a jealous fear of German aggrandizement, the desire that the little peoples may henceforth be enabled to live a free and unmolested existence has become, during the process of the war itself, a moving popular force. This will be of weight in determining the conditions of peace. A war in origin political and economic, the work of "secret diplomacy," has become clearer and more idealistic in purpose as those who have offered their lives in the conflict have sought a worthy reason for doing so.

The cause of the war is no longer The Cause in the war. The conditions of peace offered the vanquished by the victors are the test of the purity of motive attained through sacrifice and suffering. A recognition of this fact is evident in the English concern for the right settlement of the Irish question. England, seeking a restored Belgium and an independent Poland, dares suffer no longer the reproach of an oppressed Ireland. Nor need we suppose that the

desire to avoid the reproach of hypocrisy is the sole motive for England's action. A devastated Belgium has served to quicken the consciences of all civilized peoples, bringing them to a realization of their own sins and national obligations.

Yet just and desirable as is the re-establishment of autonomy and the restoration of the devastated lands of the little peoples, the victims of this war, it remains to be seen if the implications of the act are fully recognized by an England, France, and Italy concluding a victorious peace. What of India, what of Austria and the Trentino, what of Alsace-Lorraine, and what of the German colonies in Africa and the East? Is the principle to be laid down that all peoples, black and yellow no less than white, are ultimately, if not immediately, to be left free to realize their destinies without interference by the Powers? Is England to say to India, as the United States has said to the Philippines, "Once you have learned self-government and desire it we will withdraw and permit you to manage your own affairs"? England realizes in the present crisis that the strength of the empire lies in the voluntary association of her self-governing colonies. Canada and Australia responded more quickly to England's need than did England herself. Will England accord the privilege of association in the empire to a self-governing India, or even, perhaps, permit India to enter some

separate federation of Eastern peoples under the hegemony of Japan? If England refuses to declare for the principle of autonomy for all her subject peoples, the purity of her idealism in a war for human liberty, for democracy, may rightly be impugned.

The disposition of the German colonies will likewise serve to determine the character of this war. If these are divided among the Allies, on the pretext, perhaps, that they will afford part compensation for the war costs, then the war will show itself to be what most wars in the past have been, a war of conquest. Idealism, purity of motive, are, let us repeat, proved to the world only by the nature of the peace terms imposed upon the conquered. Rhetoric and patriotic protestations prove nothing in themselves; they must be verified by deeds. Insofar as German colonies are genuinely German, democratic fair dealing demands their restoration to Germany. Insofar as they are conquests of weaker peoples they should be restored to their original owners and let alone or, under some form of international guidance, aided along the path of self-government to democracy. Recent declarations by Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson promise the renunciation of colonial conquests made in the war. The British Labor Party demands that the colonies of Equatorial Africa, English as well as German, be brought under international control. In its remarkable program English Labor disclaims all

thought of imperial conquest whether by force of arms or by trade. But thus far these ideals are the expression of a minority group. It is far from certain that were the Allies victorious in the near future such ideals would find expression in the peace terms imposed upon the Central Powers. A defeated Germany we must hope for but not a Germany so impotent that the military dictators in England and France nor the faction in the United States hostile to President Wilson can realize their imperialistic ends.

More formidable than the threat of territorial conquests has been the declared purpose of the Allies to wage economic war upon the Central Powers after the military peace. The Paris agreement has worked infinite harm, has done more than any other cause perhaps to strengthen the power of German resistance and to make the liberal elements of Germany and Austria sceptical of the sincerity of our peace offers. President Wilson has disclaimed any adherence to such a program; the British Labor Party has abjured it. But those in authority in England and France have been silent or evasive for the most part. It is apparent that the exploiting groups in those countries still have hopes of depriving Germany of her former place in the commerce of the world and are not yet ready to readmit Germany and Austria on equal terms with them to world markets. That the Dardanelles should be open to the trade of all nations is a con-

summation to be wished. But German and Austrian access to the Mediterranean and to the trade routes of Asia Minor is equally legitimate and imperative if the world is to be freed from the menace of economic war, the inevitable precursor to a war of arms.

A mixture of idealism and selfishness, of democratic sentiment and commercial calculation, is evident throughout the history of the war: in its obscure origins, in the confused purposes manifest in the declarations of the participants, and in the intimations of the peace terms to be demanded by the victors. The German proposals, save insofar as they express a justifiable desire for national security, are frankly selfish and dangerous and need not concern us. But great indeed must be our concern lest selfish and mistaken motives dominate the policy of the Allies. Inevitably, insofar as the Allies look to secure national advantage and economic domination through the peace settlement, this peace will prove not the final world peace for which men hope but an armistice only, a truce between rival groups of exploiters. The men who have given their blood so freely in the hope that good might come of their sacrifice will then have died in vain.

It is therefore needful to consider the true causes of war, the essential nature of autocracy, the character of democracy, and the relation of these to a world peace. These questions must be seen in clear

and simple outlines, seen in the large, unconfused by minor and perplexing issues, in order that we may perceive the path which mankind must follow to freedom and happiness. Insofar as we have power we must guide the world into the true path at the present auspicious moment. We cannot believe too intensely that this is a crucial point in human history, a moment which may determine the welfare of the world for generations. On the one hand lies the dreary prospect of endless rivalries, jealousies, and oppressions such as the world has always known, with their weight of misery for the greater part of mankind. And on the other lies the prospect of a fair and ordered world advancing with an ever clearer vision along the path of freedom and beauty, with science and art and noble living not the chance accessories of a limited class but the whole of life for everyone.

§ 3

The desire for power, the might of empire, the Alexanders, the Caesars, and Napoleons, the Clives, the Bismarcks, and the Rhodes's—these are the forces and the names which colour the page of history and thrill us as we read. They summon to mind centurions with their wounds all to the front, the Old Guard dying at Waterloo, Sepoys and sieges, diamonds and gold mines, and diplomatic lying and intrigue ele-

vated to the realm of art. They are picturesque and enthralling and it is easy to forget their true significance, the basis upon which they were reared—the bodies and the bones of men. Power and empire are economic. The legions of Caesar were paid with the tribute of kings and each ounce of gold represented the toil of men sweating in the fields and the mines or braving death upon the sea. The Grand Army sacked Europe. The wealth of India and South Africa was wrung from the bodies of yellow and black men. The price of Alsace-Lorraine was the blood of German boys, and the tribute wrested from France was paid from the hoardings of peasants. This is the background of world dominion and the might of empire. It is as true in peace as in war. World power is wrung from the factory workers in Manchester, Essen, and Pittsburgh, and from the negroes of the Congo and the Indians in the upper reaches of the Amazon. Empire is based on the exploitation of the many by the few, and none of the glories of war or the triumphs of peace should blind us to that fact. All world powers share the guilt, those we speak of as autocratic and those which we call democratic, and the callousness of Prussian militarism and *schrecklichkeit* should not blind us to the sins that are ours.

Though "dollar diplomacy" is the true diplomacy of practical statesmen the world over, there are inci-

dental and contributing currents of altruism which mollify national aggression and selfishness. Some years ago there was much talk of the "white man's burden." The European peoples professed their obligation to bring light and justice to the dark corners of the earth. Missionaries follow the flag, and the commercial traveller sells cotton goods to the converts shamed in their nudity by the teachings of the Gospel. It is easy to be cynical and to declare all missionary enterprise a sham, a device to secure trade. So the Germans believe all Englishmen hypocrites professing the enlightened destiny of England and making enlightenment pay. To call the Englishman hypocritical is to misunderstand his mixed motives. He desires to make money but he also likes to see things "decent," to have the law administered without fear or corruption. He contrives to achieve both aims, though the desire to make money may be dominant.

Were commercialism, however, so callous and so clear sighted as to civilize only to exploit, it would in its establishment of courts and its endowment of schools and missions defeat its own purpose. For though a subject people, in its development from savagery to civilization, may for a time provide good markets, the moment comes when the exchange of a string of gold nuggets for a string of glass beads ceases to be possible. And with the establishment of

order and justice and the growth of education comes national self-consciousness and a desire for political and economic independence. Japan learned early and well the white man's mechanical skill and now profits commercially from him. India, too, I take it, is less profitable now to England than in the time of Clive and must grow increasingly self-sufficient. England gives more in administrative efficiency than once and for what she imports in goods must pay a fairer price. Thus commercialism in part defeats its purpose of giving as little as it can for as much as it can get, for men are, happily, so constituted that with the left hand they unconsciously undo some of the evils committed by the right.

Yet the commercial might of England still is based upon control of the sea, vast foreign markets, and an industrial population fortunately situated with respect to the raw materials of machine industry, coal and iron. Still more is her power based upon vast accumulations of capital, which enable her to invest abroad and do on a smaller scale in her colonies what she has done at home, subjugate the consumer to the will of capital and exact profits from the toil of coolie and factory hand. As the world grows, the profits of industrial enterprise become less the tribute exacted by the conqueror from subject peoples and more the toll of the exploiting class exacting its gains indifferently from all classes the world over, includ-

ing the working and consuming classes of its own people.

Germany, less happily situated than England and with inferior resources in soil and mines, entering the race for colonies too late to acquire many of commercial value, has been able through technical education and the efficiency of a highly centralized and autocratic control of all the forces of her people, to acquire the prestige which she enjoyed at the opening of the present war. Endowed by nature with inferior opportunities she has rivalled and in many respects surpassed both England and the United States in the excellence and cheapness of her manufactures. In Germany as nowhere else in the world and as never before in history autocracy has achieved an almost perfect industrial success.

This success, moreover, and herein lies the threat of autocracy to the freer peoples throughout the world, has been attained without alienating the loyalty of its citizens. We must not forget that the patriotic spirit of the Germans is as fervid as that of the French and English, that they have made unspeakable sacrifices and borne patiently greater hardships than have any other of the large nations in the struggle. Such patriotism bespeaks more than ingrained obedience and sacrifice of self at the behest of the state. It is born of material well-being, opportunity for recreation and culture, education, security, and freedom

from the terrors of accident and old age—all these made possible by autocratic foresight and executive ability.

Is it not significant that despite a population too vast for her restricted territories, Germany has sent to America during the last two decades far fewer emigrants than in the '50's and '60's when her industrial system had not been established and her population was relatively small? Germany, the least democratic of the great nations, has succeeded where the democratic countries have failed: she has cared for her people, seen to their bodily welfare, and largely contented them. The wisdom of Bismarck in stealing the thunder of the social-democrats and anticipating the popular demand for industrial betterment has been vindicated by the loyalty of the Germans to their government in this war. They have suffered much and may yet endure more. Restriction of liberty at the polls, in the press, in speech, weigh little against the outstanding fact that in Germany, during peace, life is reasonably secure, material comfort assured to all who will accept their lot in life as determined by birth and material circumstance, and old age, accident, and ill-health are robbed in part of their terrors by a thorough and compulsory system of state insurance.

In England, France, and the United States the worker has a vote, he may go and come as he likes,

he may speak freely in criticism of his government and his king or president. But he has few other privileges and may better his material position only through his own efforts or through co-operation in a labour union. The state does little to aid him, little to insure shorter hours of toil, better working conditions, higher wages, or security in illness and old age. He can secure only what he is able to extort by political and industrial pressure, and this is far less actual than theoretical. Like his fellows in all but the capitalistic class he is the victim of circumstance, must take whatever employment offers, at the usual wage, and is seldom so fortunate as materially to improve his condition. The state does not insure him a sound education, adequate training for any calling, nor does it care for him when he and his family become the victims of accident or industrial depressions.

The German statesman looks upon the democratic countries with contempt. He sees their wasteful methods, their disease, crime, and poverty. He sees that only after much time and loss do they become efficient in war. The autocracy of Germany seems by comparison a far more efficient form of government. Nor is the German worker blind to the same contrast. He sees that political freedom divorced from industrial security is illusory. He would wish more voting power, a fuller representation in the Reichstag, and other reforms. But he clings

to his manifest advantages and prefers to remain in Germany under his kaiser and bureaucrats rather than emigrate to freer countries where the advantages he knows at home are to be won only by the few.

In England and the United States we have made a little progress in social legislation and improvement during the last fifteen years, stirred thereto by the example of Germany. But broadly speaking the contrast is as stated. Politically we are free, not actually but potentially. Freedom is ours, that is to say, if we have the sense to seize it. But industrially we are not free but enslaved; not to specific institutions, governments, and kings but to the unregulated social and economic forces of our society. We are enslaved in the sense that the savage is enslaved by ignorance, the whim of the seasons, the fertility of soil and timeliness of rains, or the migrations of the elk and caribou. Classes and groups struggling to achieve control of the sources of wealth enslave the individual no less than do the forces of nature.

Economic well being is not the whole of life, to be sure. Freedom of movement and speech, the right to vote for one's representative in government, are great and important rights, won at great cost and marking a long step in human progress. But the rights of education, enjoyment of leisure, freedom from the terrors of accident, sickness, and pauperism are great rights also; they, too, are liberty, and of

this kind of liberty the democratic peoples know all too little. The well-disciplined German, innocent of a desire to walk upon the grass plot marked *verboten*, feels it no restriction upon his freedom that he may not. But were he deprived of those privileges for which he cares, his right of recreation and music, and his freedom from insecurity he would shake the pillars of empire. A free citizen of the United States may exercise the right to vote, may denounce president and congress, and may read and circulate revolutionary literature. But he may, incidentally, never realize a decent education, the right to sleep in a comfortable bed, breathe fresh air, and play with his children in a garden of his own.

Never before has autocracy been so formidable to the progress of the world as that of Germany now, for never before has autocracy contrived to make its people so content. And we might be tempted to add that democracy has not for long been so feeble as now, in view of the tremendous coalition needed to defeat Germany. But democracy has thus far in the world's history been largely illusory, an aspiration rather than an achieved fact. It has never been so paramount as autocracy now is in Germany. Perhaps it may demonstrate its power, once firmly established and more completely realized, to control the industrial forces of society so that all its citizens may know security and bodily well being. That, at any

rate, is democracy's one hope not alone against Germany but against autocracy the world over. Germany defeated in this war will grow strong again. We cannot impose our institutions upon her by force. The spirit of autocracy in Germany, if it is to be destroyed must be destroyed from within. And this can be only when the German citizen looking abroad sees the examples of a finer and freer way of life in the democratic states about him. If he sees this truer freedom and finer life manifested in the institutions and social well being of his neighbours he will be emulous of them.

These ideals and object lessons we must supply. We must exemplify in the organization and conduct of our peoples the possibilities of a democracy truly free yet efficient. This is our one hope not alone for the defeat of Germany but for the defeat of autocracy the world over. For it is not impossible that a realignment of autocratic powers, twenty-five or fifty years hence, might overthrow the struggling, half-realized democracies of the world. Suppose the central powers, humiliated by the terms of peace and desirous of revenge, preparing themselves for a second war, allying themselves with an autocratic Japan which controls China and her resources of men and materials. Suppose India clamouring for self-government denied by England. The mastery of the world might pass to autocracy and the democratic

ideal be delayed a hundred years in its realization. Only as democracy conquers not by the sword but by the evidences it gives of its divine fitness to rule because of its advancement of human welfare will it effectually overcome militarism and the desire for imperial sway. Then only will the German or the Japanese look with discontent upon the social system of which he is a part and alter it after a better model.

§ 4

What is this democracy in whose name we make war upon autocracy? We associate it in some way with freedom, but the nature of this freedom, the restrictions imposed upon it by necessity, and the possibilities of its enlargement we often do not consider. Complete freedom of the individual means, doubtless, opportunity to do whatsoever he wills, to work, or rest, or play as he likes, to go wherever he elects, to eat what he prefers, and gratify all bodily and mental desires as he chooses. Such freedom is impossible to man. Barriers of seas and mountains, an imperious hunger, which he must satisfy, and the conflicting desires of other men with whom he must perforce live, hedge in each one, confine him to a relatively small portion of the earth's surface, impose upon him the necessity of toil if he is to eat, and demand that the conflict of his desires with those of other men be somehow reconciled. Government in

communities and states is the imperative compromise effected by individuals each desirous of doing many things the right to which he must surrender if he is to retain others. The surrender of liberties is, then, the first requisite for the establishment of any government. The function of government is to make the surrender rest as lightly as possible upon the individual and to compensate for it by the grant of privileges which spring from the association of individuals under wise guidance.

In empires, kingdoms, and aristocracies the surrender of freedom is not uniform throughout the state nor is the distribution of new freedoms under the government, equal. Kings and lords enjoy immunities unknown to the mass of the people. The theory upon which freedom of movement, exemption from manual toil, and other privileges are granted the few or forcibly seized by them is that in return these chosen individuals shall give their services to the wise governing of the state. It is held that wealth, lands, and hereditary succession are essential to the maintenance of such leadership. The system of government is so devised as to make the persistence of the social order as established, secure. Were the rulers freely elected to office by the people, the retention of privilege in the hands of a class would not long continue. A king if elected is, therefore, elected by the nobles or those representative of the prop-

ertied interests. He is not chosen, as in the tribe, by the vote of all the warriors. A property qualification has been established.

As wealth accumulates and as political power comes to mean increased privilege—immunity from toil, choicer food, more delicate women, exemptions before the law—political machinery manipulated by a ruling class is made to subserve the interests of that class at the expense of the mass. Without the debasing pressure of privilege and exemption the aristocrat, or much more, the king, has as an incentive to honourable action the admiration and good will of his people. But with privilege and the power to perpetuate privilege by political control, selfish gratifications become usually more seductive than the desire for honour. It is then that empires become magnificent and are destroyed, that aristocracies perish of dry rot, and new rulers and new hereditary orders succeed the old and repeat the cycle of glory and decay.

Such has been the history of the world until recent times and the growth of the democratic ideal. An hereditary aristocracy has resisted the movement of the mass to take political power into its hands, and still resists, as in England, by absorbing men of political and financial achievements, thus renewing its blood and increasing its wealth. Nevertheless the democratic ideal, that men should share equally in the

burdens and privileges of government, has grown stronger and modified the political institutions of all progressive countries. Yet with the extension of the franchise and the adoption of various devices whereby the participation in government of hitherto inarticulate classes has seemed assured has come little amelioration of the common lot. Men have fought for the ballot thinking that in it lay the power to set them free, and they have found themselves still the slaves of circumstance. Aristocracies and class distinctions may be swept away, kings and titles destroyed, but power remains, as before, not with the mass but with a class.

Power resides in property. Those with wealth have found a hundred ways in which to emasculate democratic political institutions whose purpose has been to establish genuine popular control of government. To retain the privileges and immunities of aristocracy, if not the name, has been the object and to a great extent the achievement of the propertied class. It has resorted to bribery, controlled the machinery of elections, intimidated and bewildered the masses, and seduced popular leaders inimical to its security in ways no less efficacious than direct bribery: by marriage alliances, social recognition, flattery, by offering easy roads to wealth. Like all intelligent aristocracies it has seen that the permanency of its tenure to power lies in its ability to absorb the most

courageous, ambitious, and intelligent of the men of all classes who seek to rise. The mass is powerless without leaders. It is the policy of aristocracy to be hospitable to such men and make them a part of itself.

Democracy may mean, then, and does mean today in America three things: It is an ideal of government —of the people, by the people, and for the people— an ideal only in part realized; it means institutions to the attainment of this ideal, and these in part we have, though their efficacy has not proved what we hoped; and lastly it means opportunity to rise from the mass and share in the privileges and immunities of class. It is upon this equality of opportunity that as a nation we chiefly pride ourselves. This is the democracy which appeals to the ambitious American. It is his boast and belief that anyone in the country has the opportunity of becoming president, or what is yet more desirable, a captain of industry and master of great wealth.

Yet if this democracy of opportunity upon which the American prides himself ever truly existed, does it exist today as widely as once? Does not the growth in power and stability of our industries and financial institutions and the concentration of the country's wealth in the hands of a relatively small class, yearly increase the difficulty of entrance into that class? The boastful American points to a Harriman, Schwab,

or Ford to prove his belief that any "hustling" American can become a millionaire provided he has the brains and the grit, but I believe that the advertising pages of the popular magazines afford a better clue to the trend of the times. In them you will read of the fifty-thousand dollar man and the hundred-thousand dollar man wanted to manage a great industry, or of the man who attained such a position through mastering an encyclopedia or a memory system. It is a large wage, but still a wage. The organizing and directing genius of the country may rise high in the service of vested wealth. But it is the servant of it and maintains its place only for service rendered. De Tocqueville predicted that the danger to American democratic institutions lay in the appropriation of legal talent to the services of wealth and industry. That prediction came to pass long ago. We witness today the analogous appropriation of industrial and business talent to the like service. Democracy of opportunity in America means the opportunity to become a high salaried servant, and this opportunity is open only to a few, by reason of unequal education, strength, chance, and a host of factors which make the freest competition other than "free."

But equality of opportunity, if, with the unequal powers of men such can ever truly exist, is not the ideal democracy for which men are willing to die. By equality of opportunity we mean, at the best, op-

portunity to surpass our fellows and attain privileges which they do not enjoy: it is equal opportunity to attain the state of inequality. So defined, democracy could connote neither equality nor freedom. It is a far remove from that aspiration to bear equally and share equally which, I take it, men feel the democratic ideal to be: the belief that all men, however unequal their powers, should have equal opportunity for happiness, self realization to the best of their ability, and equal freedom, practicable in a society, from the restraints upon the body. Such an ideal demands that political power equally shared be devoted to the establishment of an industrial democracy. Free political institutions, desirable as these are, do not constitute a sufficient end in themselves. They are chiefly desirable as an instrument whereby men may attain a more tangible equality in labour, goods, and opportunity for enjoyment.

Freedom, let us repeat, can never be absolute. It can mean only this: a bondage equally shared, a privilege equally enjoyed. It is not that autocracy imposes restrictions upon the will of the individual which makes it irksome. All society must restrict the individual. But that this restriction may be as light as possible it must be imposed and borne by all. Only as men bear and share alike can they work to the common end of making their burdens lighter and their enjoyment greater. When the burden is un-

equal, selfishness inevitably leads the few to profit at the expense of the many. And this is autocracy, the imposition of the will of the few upon the conduct of the many. Autocracy may be the despotic militarism of Prussia, an aristocracy of titles and land, or a plutocracy. Whatever its form its substance is the same and its ultimate effect upon men maleficent, however kindly and paternalistic its intent.

§ 5

If the ideals of democracy are increasingly to determine the relations of states and nations one with another, something in the nature of an international court to which the smaller peoples may appeal for justice against the aggressions of more powerful nations is a first requisite. The Hague Court was a tentative essay in this direction but was of small practical value by reason of its powerlessness to enforce decisions. The League to Enforce Peace, which seems a likelihood at the conclusion of the present war, bears in its very name better promise of success. Regrettable though it may be, force is still essential to the maintenance of law and order in society, both in the state and in the realm of international affairs. The time has not yet come to dispense with it. But the time has certainly come when force should be made subservient to justice and no longer be the weapon of national ambition over-riding the wishes

and rights of weaker peoples. If the nations are regarded for what they are, merely families of the world clan, or individual members of a single family, there is nothing startling in the conception of a court established by common consent and greater in power than any one of its members; a court to which the individual states delegate their powers and by whose decisions they agree to abide.

As individuals each of us is subservient to law, before which, ideally, we stand upon an equal footing. The citizen attacked by a bully appeals to it for protection. That he could not, of his own might, resist the cowardly attack for which he seeks redress is the very cause of the court's existence. The court assumes the equality of individuals before it not in their powers physical, mental, or moral but in their right to safety and the pursuit of happiness. They are equal as souls. And it is in the terms of this abstract equality that nations must be judged before the bar of an international court. The nation that by reason of its size or arrogance encroaches upon its neighbour can base no defence upon the old maxim that might is right. Nor can it safely be permitted to swagger, gun on hip, through the public streets. It is the function of the police, whether municipal or international, to disarm ruffians, the function of the court to mete out punishment, the function of religion, education,

and moral example to reform them and lead them to a better way of life.

The degree of domestic interference which should be permitted a court cannot easily be defined. Family affairs and domestic quarrels we are inclined to leave alone unless they intrude so violently upon the peace and comfort of neighbours that they are deemed a public nuisance. Then we call for the police. We do not individually interfere, for we feel incompetent to the task. A dispassionate tribunal is essential to the adjudication of the issues. The interfering neighbour whose nerves have been set on edge, or to whose interest it is that the dispute should be settled in one way rather than another, is not the proper person to decide the case. The analogy of this generalized instance to the recent revolution in Mexico and the conduct of the United States is obvious. The United States was too close a neighbour, her interests too deeply involved, to interfere. But had there been a competent international court, Mexico's case should have been passed upon in short order and she forced to a more neighbourly manner of living.

If we pursue the analogy of the domestic court to an international court a step farther, it would seem only sensible to grant the league of nations, as represented in their tribunal, control of the seas and all

highways necessary to free intercommunication, permitting all nations equal rights thereto. A highroad is free to all, subject to regulations essential to its proper use. If necessary it is policed. There is also a further extension of this right of free communication. One possessed of a piece of property completely surrounded by land owned by others has nevertheless the right of access to it. Otherwise it would be largely valueless to him, for he would be completely dependent upon his neighbour's goodwill and sense of justice. What then of Poland, Servia, the small states which may perhaps be formed from the disintegration of Austria? And what of Germany in need of a port upon warm water and of a trade route through the Balkans to the Levant? Why should these legitimate needs be denied? Railroads and docking privileges at the most desirable seaports, and these free from tariffs and unjust exactions, could be granted all inland countries were the principles of common justice as they have been developed in civilized countries extended to international relations.

These first steps for the establishment of better international relations demand no radical departures from the principles of common justice proved practicable in hundreds of years of human intercourse. That they should seem at all novel to us is a commentary upon the archaic system of international relations as we have hitherto known it. The citizen's

rights, his personal freedom, the protection he enjoys, have grown immensely during the last two centuries. But international relations have not so changed. The attitude of states one to another is still mediaeval. Its nearest parallel in domestic conditions would be, perhaps, the relations of the barons in England in the "troublesome reign of King John." England was then a group of virtually independent baronies, earldoms, and duchies incessantly at war and requiring a strong overlord to bring them to law and order and permit industry to develop and commerce to flow freely. This is much the international condition and need today.

A yet more suggestive parallel because economic—and the root of our present international rivalry and suspicion is largely economic—is the state of the German principalities and kingdoms previous to the formation of the customs union which paved the way to the establishment of the empire. Every kingdom, duchy, and free city exacted its toll from merchandise carried through it from a seaport to an inland destination. This condition of affairs was intolerable, for it stifled economic life and industrial development. Upon the removal of these economic barriers and the virtual creation of Germany as an industrial unit, she grew immediately in economic power. It is significant that this economic union preceded and was the direct cause of a closer political union. And sim-

ilar conditions and results may be observed in the early history of our own country. The intolerable economic conditions which prevailed under the Articles of Confederation led to our present constitution, under which Congress, though granted restricted powers in many respects, was permitted complete control of customs duties and all interstate commerce.

Thought of as an economic unit, every part of which is in some degree dependent upon other and alien parts, the world presents today much the appearance of the thirteen original colonies prior to 1789, or Germany after the Napoleonic wars. Tariffs and export duties, control of trade routes and canals, Gibraltar and Suez, are so many checks upon the free flow of commerce, so many stoppages in the arteries of the world. If the world is to become a place in which the nations stand upon an equal footing, industrially no less than politically, these checks must be done away with. These artificial barriers are relics of a primitive and selfish conception of the state, of the belief that a nation should profit at the expense of its neighbour. That individual states may profit by the accidents of situation or by the control of colonies and trade routes backed by military power is unhappily the case, but that every selfish gain so exacted is a net economic loss to the world is equally certain. Every delay and exaction making the interchange of goods slow, difficult, and costly is an addi-

tion to the original cost of the goods, so much lost from the working time of the world, and insofar an artificial check upon industry and the arts. A free circulation is essential to health alike in the individual, the nation, and the world.[1]

But tariffs, and the wealth and power which they give those nations most favoured by geographic position, capital, organization, and military fitness, are much more than checks upon the economic life of the world and a means to the inequitable distribution of the world's wealth. They are a direct cause of international strife. A recent instance of this fact is offered in the case of the present war of which one of the underlying causes was a highly discriminatory trade treaty forced by Germany upon Russia during the Russo-Japanese war, a treaty which benefitted Germany greatly at Russia's expense. Provisions of this treaty protecting the German farmer from the importation of Russian agricultural products demark a segment of the vicious circle of trade wars and imperial ambitions. German farmers, tilling poor soil under adverse economic conditions, were subsidized in order that Germany, in time of war, might be able to feed her people from her own produce. German

[1] President Wilson's advocacy of the removal of tariff barriers — a purpose which has aroused much uneasiness among the capitalistic class in this country — promises to make the economic causes of war an important consideration in the negotiations for a permanent peace.

foresight has been justified in the event. German blindness in forcing an unjust treaty upon Russia and in strengthening German manufactures at the expense of the Russian farmer made Russia, needlessly, her enemy. More than this, the German policy and all similar policies which foster industries and agriculture under adverse natural conditions, are the cause of an economic loss to mankind. The German farmers would better have engaged in some other occupation and imported their grain from Russia where it could be more profitably and easily grown.

Were the world an economic unit under the direction of a single expert, Mr. Hoover perhaps, it is easy to imagine him issuing his decrees and planning the maximum yield for the minimum of effort expended. Argentine, Canada, Russia, and the United States might perhaps be commanded to grow sufficient wheat and beef cattle to supply the world's need. The Scandinavian countries, the United States, and the countries bordering the Andes would be made the manufacturing centres of the world for all mineral products by reason of their mines and cheap water power. Cotton would be spun and woven chiefly in the Appalachian highlands. To each part of the world would be assigned that portion of the world's industry to which it was best suited by reason of situation, raw materials, transportation facilities and the like. The problem is, of course, vastly more compli-

cated in fact than this Utopian solution indicates, for the world's population is not distributed in accordance with the best possible economic development. In countries such as England, Germany, and Holland it is too dense. In Australia, parts of Africa and the United States it is too sparse. This uneven distribution is largely the result of the artificial conditions which natural barriers, tariffs, and national rivalries and ambitions have fostered. But were the world in the hands of a dictator a first consideration would be the redistribution of the world's population in accordance with economic needs.

The pressure of population, due to racial division, national rivalries, geographical barriers, tariffs, and similar natural or artificial causes, is a permanent source of international friction and a root cause of the present war. Consequent upon its industrial expansion fostered by the government's policy of subsidizing manufactories and establishing trade and technical schools, the wealth of Germany permitted a vast increase of population while at the same time the scale of living was raised. But Germany is a small country to house sixty millions of people and the pressure has been increasingly felt, expressing itself in Germany's attempt to gain colonies oversea. Her success has been small, for the unappropriated parts of the globe have proved largely uninhabitable to white men. England, similarly situated indus-

trially, has drawn off much of her surplus population to her prosperous colonies. Germany, balked in her attempts elsewhere, has attempted, therefore, to expand to the southeast, centering her ambitions in Asia Minor, a region offering both markets and, if scientifically developed, a home for a dense white population.

The alternative to such overflow of population and seizure of colonies is periodic war wherein the excess male population is killed off and, in the German philosophy, the warlike spirit of the race thereby maintained. In practice Germany has resorted to both expedients in her efforts both to relieve pressure at home and to acquire imperial power. And in so doing Germany has followed the practice of the white race throughout history, though of late the expansion of the white man has been at the expense chiefly of the black and yellow peoples. The colonization of the Americas has meant in part the destruction and in part the absorption of the Indian. The Bushman and the Maori are all but extinct, and in South Africa those regions best suited to white settlement have been largely cleared of their original inhabitants. The white man has not always resorted to slaughter to demonstrate his superior fitness to rule. His vices and diseases, the changed conditions of life which his coming forces upon native peoples, have usually been sufficient to clear his path for him. Whiskey

and small pox are more deadly than the repeating rifle.

Pressure of population and the need of colonies are not, however, problems peculiar to the white race. The yellow race, equally tenacious, fertile, and confident of its destiny, also needs room in which to grow. Japan, in Korea and Manchuria, is finding homes for the overflow of her people; the Chinese have spread along the Malay Peninsula and through the East Indies. Had they not been excluded they would have colonized Australia and the Pacific slope of the United States.

The white and yellow races face the problem of acquiring sufficient and suitable lands for the maintenance of an evergrowing population or of limiting their populations to the resources which they now possess. Advances in agricultural science permit, to be sure, ever denser and self-sufficing populations upon lands already occupied, but the growth in food supply cannot keep pace with the growth in numbers. There is a limit to the tillable soil and to its productivity. To human fertility unchecked by war, disease, or deliberate control, there is no limit. What, then, must be the outcome of this struggle for land? Either the world must persist in its present course, the fiercer races preying upon the weaker and when these are destroyed turning upon each other in a brute unending struggle, or more intelligent methods

must guide man in his adaptation to his environment. Man has thus far obeyed his brute instincts. He has now to demonstrate his possession of a higher intelligence wherewith to guide his destiny.

Happily the world does not lack its object lessons proving national control of population feasible. For a considerable time previous to the present war the population of France had grown so slowly as to be regarded as virtually static. The fact has been cited by many as a proof not of French intelligence and national self-sufficiency but of degeneracy—on the analogy, doubtless, that the fertile guinea pig is in some mysterious way superior to the less procreant elephant. The correspondence of population in France to the means of economic support is a demonstration not of degeneracy—and we hardly needed the heroic proofs France has offered in the war to convince us of her vitality—but of her wisdom, her self-control, her concern for the true welfare of her people. She is one nation that proves colonies and imperial growth unnecessary and unintelligent. In Holland, likewise, we find an analogous situation, knowledge of the means to birth control and its practice being encouraged by the government.

Sooner or later the world must follow the examples of France and Holland if human existence is to remain tolerable to highly intelligent and moral beings. The time may be postponed if our ethical code per-

mits a continuance of the world-old practice of destroying the weaker races and seizing their lands. It is even remote if intelligent effort is put forth to reclaim and colonize the subarctic regions, the tropical jungles, and the deserts, all of which may be made habitable by the exercise of international co-operation and scientific knowledge. Ultimately, however, the necessity of a static population the world over must be met; and in China, Germany, England, and other densely populated areas it should be met now if urgent social problems are to be solved and if international relations are to rise to a plane above that of feudalism or tribal warfare.

In the settlement of the issues raised by this war the problem of population has immediately to do with the disposition of colonies inhabited chiefly by the black, yellow, and brown races. Is the world to continue its policy of seizure and extermination—deliberate or involuntary—or are the subject peoples, in the light of a higher morality, to be considered as wards of an international court, and their continuance and welfare looked after? Ethnologists assure us that there is no such thing as an inferior people, ethnologically speaking, and that though they differ widely at present in degree of culture and civilization, the intellectual potentialities of brown, white, and yellow men are the same. Some doubt is cast upon the black man's claim to equal standing; but it is at most

only a doubt, and largely weakened by the evidences of the negro's intellectual and moral development under favourable conditions.

We must, then, regard the peoples of the earth as equal in their possibilities if not in their present attainments. They have, moreover, their individual contributions to make to the world's morality, philosophy, and art. If our scientific achievements contribute to the welfare and culture of the Japanese and Chinese, no less have their art, religion, and philosophy already enriched European thought and culture. In our arrogance, we of the white race, because of our greater fierceness which has enabled us to conquer a large part of the earth, assume our superiority to all other races. We should not forget that the educated Chinese and Japanese look with contempt upon our material philosophy and our lust for power. They see in our fierce pale eyes and sharp noses a likeness to the birds of prey with "beaks that rend and tear." Are they not justified in their contempt?

The higher international morality demands, then, in the solution of the problem of colonies, that we consider the preferences and prejudices of those governed. If we exclude the Chinese coolie from our shores, it is only just that the Chinese exclude American capital and commercial adventurers if they find it to their interest to do so. If democracy implies equality and is to hold among nations as among indi-

viduals, there cannot be two laws, one for the white race and another for the rest of the world. And in the international council which is, we hope, to initiate joint control of international problems, preserve the peace, and keep open the avenues of trade, the voice of other nations should be as potent as our own. Democracy among the peoples of the world, as among individuals, demands the surrender of privilege born of blood, or tradition, or might. The world can never achieve a genuine democracy until the white race drop all pretence to superiority and a divine right to rule. If they demonstrate their superiority, mental, moral, or spiritual, the leadership of the world will be theirs even under conditions which inhibit physical domination. If they fail to demonstrate their superiority, the leadership of the world will pass to those races more deserving of it.

The League to Enforce Peace, as the first of the international institutions to take over the government of the world, should, then, both for political expediency and as a proof of its moral right to the function it assumes, reassure the little peoples and the subject races that they are truly wards of the court and that their welfare is the concern of the Powers. They should be assured of the right to self-government, freedom from aggression, and aided to develop the culture and civilization peculiar to them. India, Poland, Servia, Belgium and the rest, without the Alps

and a citizenry trained to the use of arms, would then take such a place as Switzerland now holds among the nations, independent and respected.

But this political freedom and the right of self-government are not enough. Economic freedom is more vital than autonomy. A free Servia denied a seaport or with the markets of Austria closed to her would not be truly free, free, that is, to prosper and develop a complex domestic economy. Tariff barriers are as effective as arms in keeping the weaker peoples in subjection. The danger, at the conclusion of the war, is not so much that political tyranny will continue and grow—for the costliness and futility of it will be fresh in all men's minds—but that the nations will endeavour to recoup their losses by profitable trade alliances and the exploitation of weaker peoples. China, especially, with her vast resources and cheap labour, invites aggression. Japan, nearest of the great powers, is seizing her opportunity to preempt economic privileges in China, but once the war is over other powers will attempt to gain their share. Japanese aggression like German aggression must give way before a wiser and more righteous international morality and China be helped to stand on her own feet and realize her destiny.

Nor will it be either just or politic to discriminate against Germany and make her the victim of trade wars. To do so would be dangerous, for Germany

so abused would prepare herself for future wars; the hatred, which will be the heritage of this war, would not be permitted to die. Moreover, the world, in any such trade alliance excluding the importation of German products, would lose the great benefit of German skill and technical efficiency in the manufacturing arts. And these are amongst the assets of the world from which all peoples should profit. Freedom to pursue the arts of peace and to exchange commodities no less than ideas must be the basis of any international union which is to endure and not be periodically subject to the menace of war.

That all tariff barriers the world over should be at one stroke removed is doubtless impracticable under existing conditions. Populations and industries are now artificially distributed, not to the ultimate economic welfare of the world as a whole but in accordance with a multitude of factors which are the product of chance and calculation: of artificial restrictions and stimuli, of subsidies and discriminating tariffs, of technical education and efficiency, of varying standards of living, and of racial animosities and hostile alliances. It would not be easy to turn at once to a freer and saner economic order, one in which industrial development is fostered in strict response to the needs of a particular population, or the industrial workers of the world are so distributed as best to meet the needs of the world as a whole. To remove all

tariffs would be to repeat the industrial confusion subsequent upon the introduction of power machinery in the north of England at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Fundamental changes of this sort must needs be made slowly and in accordance with some international plan. A plan so comprehensive demands a more closely knit international organization than we can hope for in the immediate future. Yet it would be but a logical outgrowth of the League to Enforce Peace. It and the power to enforce it must ultimately come if the world is to know the final destruction of national rivalries. Such a development demands, however, the internal reorganization of the chief industrial nations, and of this I shall have more to say in the next chapter.

A single instance of the difficulty to be encountered in the removal of tariff barriers and the reorganization of industry upon a world basis is manifest in the differing standards of living which prevail among the various peoples. If those peoples among whom a low standard of living now prevails were permitted to flood the world with the products of their factories, as would be the case were tariffs removed and the present unregulated system of capitalistic production allowed to continue, China, Japan, and India might rapidly become the manufacturing centres of the world. The industrial populations of the United States and Germany, which have lived upon protected

industries, would then, to a great extent, be thrown out of employment. England, a free-trading nation, would be in better case, though under these conditions the standard of living of her industrial workers, already too low, could hardly be improved. Economic freedom the world over, with its incalculable benefits in reducing the cost of commodities to all, demands for its realization that standards of living be virtually uniform throughout the world.

The cost of transporting goods from countries so remote as Japan modifies somewhat the necessity of equalizing the standards of living of Oriental and Occidental countries but does not materially affect the problem. The question of "dumping," whereby goods are sold cheaper abroad than at home—a fruitful cause of international friction as has been pointed out by economists—is a further complication. But this, too, like the standard of living is only in part an international question. It has to do chiefly with the industrial organization of the individual nations and must be considered in that place. Only as the capitalistic system within the various countries is so modified as to permit a rising standard of living among the workers, and a uniform standard the world over, can the international problems of world production for world consumption be satisfactorily solved. We can premise at this point of the discussion only this: that wherever possible without too great dislocation

of industry, present tariff barriers should be lowered or removed. And by no fatal selfishness should additional barriers be erected at this time to put further checks upon the free intercourse of peoples.

§ 6

This discussion of the economic implications of a world democracy in its international aspects has probably been carried to a point sufficiently removed from immediate issues, those of the impending peace. There is enough of a program here to command the statesmanship, the clear thinking, and the unselfishness of nations for a long time to come. That much or all of it should ever be realized requires that diplomacy such as we have known in the past be destroyed root and branch. Diplomacy has hitherto been an inhuman game played by nations each desirous of territorial or trade advantage at the expense of others. It is a survival of days which the morality of mankind has outgrown. It is secret and selfish. It does not spring from the formulated will of the peoples it is supposed to represent. In many nations it is the prerogative of a wealthy ruling class careless of war for which the people pay if thereby a small class may profit. For though to a nation such a war as the present costs more than a hundred years of foreign trade can repay, it may be both immediately and ultimately profitable to a small class within

the nation. The maintenance of peace demands that those who bear the cost of war have the decisive voice in international affairs. Only as the masses of the workers control their relations with kindred masses in other nations can the ideals common to all humanity find expression. War will not certainly cease even then, but that is the road of hope.

The immediate duty of the citizen desirous of influencing even so little as he can the formulation of peace terms which will make for international justice and the growth of the democratic ideal, is to exact of his government the acceptance of the following principles:

1. That diplomacy should be open and not secret. The workers, as those most vitally concerned, should have a determining voice in questions involving war and international economic policy.

2. That autonomy be granted those peoples sufficiently homogeneous and advanced to give promise of managing their affairs with a fair degree of success.

3. That weak or subject peoples, whether now nominally independent or governed as colonies, be promised ultimate autonomy; when, that is to say, they give strong evidence of their capacity therefor. Meanwhile that they be assured of protection against the aggression of stronger states, both military and economic.

4. That a league to enforce peace be established, its objects to insure the freedom of the seas, internationally policed, the limitation of armaments, and the substitution of enforced arbitration for an appeal to arms in *all* questions of dispute between the contracting nations.

5. That the large nations agree to refrain from exploiting the weaker peoples to their own advantage. That they open up trade routes accessible to all nations. That they give every inland nation access to the sea and if possible a port on ice-free water. That they refrain from trade alliances and international agreements designed to profit a few nations at the expense of others. That they offer Germany and Austria an equal place with others in the community of nations upon evidence that these two have renounced imperial and militaristic ambitions.

It is the realization of some such program as this that must be the declared object of all the Allies, not of one or two, only, nor of a minority group, if out of the tragic misery and destruction of this war some little good may come. Unless the world, with quickened conscience, with magnanimity for the vanquished, and with greater unselfishness than nations have ever before displayed, improves this opportunity to establish a better purpose and understanding among the nations, the sacrifices of the young, the strong, of those with ideals and the courage to die for them, will

have been in vain. It remains for the world in the coming peace and thereafter to demonstrate that idealism and the hope of a true democracy did not perish with the young men upon the battlefields of France.

III

THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE

If the participation of the United States in the present war proves long and costly, the administrative reorganization of our government necessary to meet the demands for food and munitions will revolutionize industry in its relation to political machinery. Even if our participation is neither long nor costly it must have considerable influence upon our future industrial and political methods, for we shall learn not only from it but also from the wider experience of England and France, our allies. Neither of these nations can return to the loose relationship of government to industry that prevailed prior to the war. Democratic theory, with its insistence upon individual rights, has hitherto minimized the function of the state. Only grudgingly and in the stress of war has it yielded to governmental interference in industrial relations to prevent conflicts between capital and labour, to control food prices, and to establish proper relations between landlord and tenant. In the seventy-five years preceding, the long struggle in the English parliament for factory legislation regulating

hours, conditions of work, the employment of women and children, and similar problems bears witness to the slow yielding of the *laissez faire* principle to the necessities of industrial change under modern conditions of life.

The war has accelerated the inevitable change. Factory workers have been mobilized no less than soldiers; hours, pay, and working conditions have passed under governmental control; war-time profits have been appropriated by the state; food prices and the distribution of foods are determined by administrative officers. Necessity has forced these innovations. In no other way has it been possible to combat effectively the efficient autocracy of Germany. And the lessons in co-operation so taught, the realization that the lives and wealth of its citizens are at the disposal of the state for the welfare of all, will not be forgotten with the return of peace. It will be impossible to return to the old unregulated competitive conditions. It seems incredible that food supplies should ever again be controlled by speculators, or the necessaries of life made the basis of monopoly profits.

The war will have taught the democratic states the necessity of a strong central government which shall control the domestic economy of its people. A divorce of political and economic functions will be recognized as no longer practicable, for it is costly

and wasteful, and permits a lowering of the efficiency of the workers. In a time of national danger it is suicidal, demanding a rapid and necessarily awkward reorganization of the state's administrative machinery. A return to the conditions that prevailed prior to the war will be impossible either in England or France. It will not be wholly possible in the United States. In our own country no less than abroad we may expect a growth in the powers of the government, a closer co-ordination of political and economic functions. But the nature of that government, whether more or less democratic than it has been hitherto, we must determine.

For it is quite an unwarranted assumption that this war, fought ostensibly in the cause of democracy, will result in greater domestic liberty for the victors. German militarism and autocracy may be crushed, for their menace is clear, while within our own borders the autocracy we know may in nowise be weakened, may even be strengthened. We do not fear sufficiently that the forces of autocracy may learn their lessons from the war and with a realization of the increased power and profit possible under a highly centralized system of economic control seek to utilize the improved machinery of government for the furtherance of their own ends. War, with its irksome burdens for the many, always profits a few despite taxes and supertaxes. Vast businesses will be built

up by the war and others strengthened. Upon the return of peace, the industries so organized will be diverted to the conquest of the nation's markets. If industrial conditions are henceforth to be increasingly subject to governmental control it will be the object of big business to be the determining power in that control.

The history of democracy in the United States makes the truth of this prediction selfevident. Democracy with us has been an ideal too often illusory, too seldom a reality even in its narrowest political sense. The framers of the Constitution, despite their pious generalizations about liberty, equality, and fraternity, distrusted the people. The central government, checked in its grasp by reason of the power granted the individual states; Congress, the President, the Supreme Court with each its check upon the others; and the representative system itself with its indirect method of electing senators and the President; and most of all the rigid amending clause of the Constitution—all these restrictions are evidences of the distrust in which the minority who framed the Constitution held the common people. Their aim was to establish a republic, not a democracy.

Since 1789 American history has been one long struggle between two forces: the one conservative, aristocratic in its sympathies, and economically powerful, seeking to maintain our institutions as they

were established; the other, democratic, radical, and economically dependent, seeking to make our political institutions more representative of the will of the people, to weaken the selfish influence of wealth and privilege upon Congress in its creation of laws, the President in their execution, and the Supreme Court in their interpretation. Much of this effort we now see to have been misdirected, for the people, distrustful of a government which was not directly responsive to their interests, sought not to make it both more powerful and more responsible but to restrict its functions, jealously clinging to state prerogatives which, with the development of nation-wide business, proved of little genuine worth. To their bewilderment they learned soon that the possession of a vote was no guarantee of popular government. The party system, the boss, the use of wealth to determine elections, and not least the subsidizing of the legal profession by the landed and industrial interests—predicted by De Tocqueville—all these went far to make the freeman possessed of a vote politically impotent save as, in national crises, an outraged public opinion overrode for a brief period the professional politician.

Democracy has undoubtedly won its occasional victories, but our political experiences have also made many of us cynical of popular government. Thousands of Americans will not vote because to do so they regard as a waste of time; they say of every public

man, however patriotic, that he has been bought, that all politicians and all parties are tarred with the same brush. We are so distrustful of our representatives in Congress that we regard them mostly as a joke, and few highly intelligent men of independent mind would take a seat in Congress were it offered them. And withal we wonder by what dispensation of Providence we have had, on the whole, such able presidents, who have contrived to force an incompetent, indolent, and often corrupt Congress to something resembling efficient legislation.

The force that has retarded the progress of democracy has been commingled of privilege, wealth, and honest conservatism, good and bad alike taking advantage of the defects in our political machinery and the existence of a class of professional politicians recruited mainly from the law, to thwart the popular will desirous of making political institutions minister to the economic wellbeing of the masses. Often this popular will has not been articulate, has not known the cause of the economic burdens which it has borne. The educated and monied classes have profited from this fact and failed to make clear the needs of those less fortunate or less intelligent than themselves. For this is the obligation of privilege and intelligence in a democracy no less than in any other form of government. No democracy that has been or ever will be can make men equal in intelli-

gence. There must always be intellectual leaders to interpret the needs of the many in order that those needs may be satisfied. Whenever the favoured classes slight this duty of leading and interpreting, then will the government inevitably more truly represent the desire of the few than the needs of the masses.

This has too largely been the case in the United States since our establishment as a nation, nor do we differ therein from other pseudo-democratic peoples. The disproportionate influence upon legislation exerted by propertied interests is no phenomenon peculiar to our day. But the recognition of the fact and its bearing upon the social problems of a nation rapidly transformed from an agricultural to a complex industrial state is recent. Property interests are also larger and more powerful than once, more conscious of their common purpose, more aware of the growing definiteness of the demands put upon them by the working classes, demands which property regards as inimical to its welfare. Commercial and manufacturers' associations are organized to oppose organized labour and national regulation of industry. The contest, if no different essentially from what it once was, is now sharper and intellectually more selfaware. That government will increasingly occupy itself with the regulation of industry is apparent. Hence the concern of the vested interests to

make that interference innocuous to those already in the saddle.

Yet to many good Americans, such a belief as I have expressed will seem wildly exaggerated if not downright untrue. It is yet a common belief that ours is a land of boundless opportunity, that with ax and gun and plough and oxen one may yet go into the wilderness and become independent. The wilderness has gone save as a place for recreation; there is no longer a frontier. The new lands to come under cultivation are reclaimed by irrigation and drainage, the old lands restored through the use of fertilizers and the application of scientific agricultural methods—requiring, that is to say, some capital and considerable education. My grandfather in 1840 bought government land in Illinois at one dollar and a quarter an acre, land that sells now for two hundred dollars. He gave his hired men a quarter section after a term of service and their descendants are substantial citizens today.

The intelligent young men who have been pouring into this country from Russia during the last fifteen years have not found our land to be what we like to think it. Nor do they see it through such rosy spectacles as those of Mary Antin in her "Promised Land." For one highly intelligent Russian boy writes that, contriving through vast hardship to come to America,

the land of opportunity, to secure an education denied him in Russia, he found that "opportunity is not for the immigrant. Instead of the university I faced the sweatshop." Then for him followed years of toil by day in order that he might go to night school. Ultimately he attained his ambition and came to college, granted, and with an appreciation of its opportunities such as few native-born Americans possess. Granted, too, that America, compared with the Russia of the old régime, knows no racial or caste distinctions. There is still, however, little of that equality of opportunity upon which we pride ourselves. Only the fittest survive, those with the strongest nerves and bodies. The weaker, no less ambitious perhaps, fill the consumptive wards of our hospitals or remain, of necessity, in sweatshop and factory.

For men of genius or of financial and administrative talent opportunity for advancement exists in all countries. Aristocracy renews its strength from these in Germany, in Russia, and in England. In England, where caste and property are more powerful than in America, a man may yet win a peerage by brewing beer, exploiting the possibilities of "yellow journalism," or attaining a success in politics or by his pen. For the exceptional man there is opportunity under any conditions of life. But this is a far different thing from opportunity for those of mediocre talents who must constitute the vast majority of every

nation. If democracy is to mean opportunity for every one we must revise our conception of it to mean this: that every man, easily and freely have access to that place in the world which he is best fitted to fill; and that in this place he be given the means to maintain himself and his family in comfort and with opportunity for wholesome recreation and the realization of his best mental and spiritual possibilities. Democracy has never meant so much as this in any land or time, in our own favoured land little more than another.

Equality of opportunity in the sense in which we usually employ the term would mean, if it meant anything, that we should all be well born, inheriting strong bodies free from defect; that we should be well nourished; that we should be equally well educated. But were all these conditions realized there would still be, in a competitive society, room at the top for a few only. Some must serve and do the manual toil of the world. And we have either to accept, for the mass, a condition of servitude such as exists or so to revise our industrial system that those who toil may enjoy some of the material benefits which are now monopolized by the few. If we permit present conditions to continue in a more highly centralized industrial state such as impends, with a society more firmly stratified than now, let us not call our system a democracy. Equality at the polls will mean little

without a genuine equality of influence in the management of our institutions, industrial no less than political.

We shall assume, then, that democracy connotes equality and freedom, economic no less than political, and it may be well to point out more specifically wherein even political democracy, in the narrow sense, is impossible unless based upon economic security. Intimidation of voters whose jobs and wages are dependent upon the will of their employers is probably not extensive, for our system of the secret ballot makes it uncertain. But there are more efficacious methods. The threat that the factory will close its doors if this or another candidate is elected or if the free traders get into power and lower the tariff, is intimidation also. The workers should not, of course, be deceived, should not be coerced by lies and economic fallacies. But the fact remains that they are so coerced and, even if suspecting motives and arguments, lean to the safe side, fearful of hazarding their jobs and wages. Economic questions are difficult at best, and it is not surprising that workers yield to the influence of those in a position to harm them. But are such in command of a free vote? Obviously not. They are driven to the polls, as to their daily tasks, by a complex of influences over which they have no control and of which they have no clear understanding. Their votes are not free nor are they of equal

weight to the votes of the intelligent and independent citizens who select their candidates and measures uninfluenced by economic pressure. Political freedom demands an economic independence that is safe from influence and intimidation; which is intelligent by reason of adequate education and opportunity for thought; which is open to intelligent guidance from disinterested sources. In this sense, political freedom is rare.

It need scarcely be pointed out that, despite our democratic theories, men are unequal before the law. The law is on the side of him who can secure the most expert counsel to plead his case, and skilled lawyers command large fees. Moreover, in civil suits the poor man is less able to pay the price of the law's delays; his means and patience are worn out before those of his wealthier adversary and he has the choice of dropping his case or pursuing it to what, at best, can be only an empty victory. This condition of affairs is recognized in our common saying that "there is one law for the rich and another for the poor." The legal aid societies established to assist the poor in securing justice, and the movement for the reform of our legal procedure all bear witness to the inequalities which exist. Yet democracy must mean that the law shall be free to all and all on a basis of true equality before it.

In whatsoever direction we turn the same truth is

manifest: that democracy has little practical meaning if political freedom is divorced from economic independence. That complete democracy would imply complete economic equality, that is to say, equality of income is, I believe, a logical deduction. But this is a consummation sufficiently remote and need not concern us now. Our immediate need is to make our country more democratic than it now is in order that we may safely permit the establishment of a more powerful and highly centralized government than we have hitherto known and take our proper place in a league of democratic states. For democracy at home is essential to international democracy. The small nations, the weak and subject peoples, will fare ill at our hands, if our democracy is not economic as well as political, practical as well as theoretical. We have, therefore, the task of limiting the power of wealth individually and corporately held, devoted, that is, to the privilege of the few rather than to the good of the many. And we have also to attack our problem from the other end, to raise the standard of living among the workers by fixing a high minimum wage, making employment secure, and insuring them against accident, disease, and old age. In short we must fit them for the acquisition and exercise of that political power now fondly but mistakenly attributed to them.

§ 2

That the growing disparity of wealth in the United States is not only harmful to the rich in the power which it gives divorced of any true sense of social responsibility, and to the poor in the envy and class hatred which it fosters, but that it is also modifying the very spirit of Americanism, a slight acquaintance with our country will show. It was not many years ago that a freeborn white American scorned a tip. To take a tip would have been the admission of inferiority, and he thought himself as good as another. In the larger cities, in the lanes of tourist travel, in resorts and hotels—wherever wealth comes in contact with service—few men will now refuse a tip, though many will reserve the right of hating those they exploit. The chauffeur and the bell-boy, the barber, the porter, and the chambermaid all expect and demand tips whether for poor service or none. A tip, if justified at all, is only so on the theory that some special and efficient service has been rendered. In practice tipping makes all service bad and destroys the spirit of honest workmanship. The man whose position makes a tip essential to his livelihood, preserves his self-respect by scorning you and doing his work as negligently as he dare. It is the same spirit that leads the workman in his craft to give as little and as slovenly work as he can and hold his job.

These are trivial instances, but I believe them significant of that change in the American spirit which class conflict and the growing disparity in wealth have brought about and are bringing about increasingly. The farther one gets from a life of complex industry and striking social contrasts the less of this servile and envious spirit he will find and the more of honest fellowship and workmanship. In the country one encounters human meanness and avarice as elsewhere but also more of the spirit of neighbourliness which gives friendly help with no expectation of return. And as one leaves the more densely settled and highly developed middle west and east and enters the thinly settled west, the more one will find of the older American spirit of democracy, the naïve belief that all men are equal, an absurd belief, perhaps, but a noble one.

Jeffersonian democracy with its assumption of simplicity, Jacksonian democracy with its pretence that all men are equally fitted to hold office, are crude in many ways, are productive of Congressmen in Stetson hats logrolling for new postoffices and military posts in the midst of the prairies. Their uncouthness and flamboyant patriotism are patent. But in the conditions which produce them, in the electors "back home," there is something we are losing in America, a belief that all men are equal in the eyes of God, a belief concretely expressed in ways incompatible with good government, often enough, but a belief which

produced Lincoln. That spiritual faith America must preserve and discipline to finer uses than once if she is to become a great and a free nation. A disciplined democracy which can recognize wise and disinterested leadership and be guided by it while yet retaining its ancient faith that unequal as men are in powers they are equal in a mystical and religious sense because equally an expression of the spiritual force that animates the world—some such democracy we seek and perhaps may attain. It is because human souls are not equally the concern of the state and because some have been completely neglected by it that the spirit of democracy has faltered.

It may indeed be that democracy is incapable of choosing wise leaders, that it is unable to subject itself to self-imposed discipline, or to serve willingly under the guidance of men of vision. Perhaps, as Bernard Shaw has suggested, human beings in the present degree of their development are not wise enough to solve the difficult problems which our modern world presents. But the only alternatives we know are autocracies which have failed and autocracies which, like that of Germany, have triumphed only at the cost of blood and servitude. Better that the human race should perish than that Germany's way prove the only way. And meanwhile we have the great hope that a democracy which is based both on economic and political freedom may ultimately solve

its problems. Such a democracy has never existed on a scale sufficiently large or amid a world sufficiently hospitable to it to permit its survival. Communistic colonies have proved little save the existence of an unquenchable human desire for a better way of life. If the world is to become a finer and freer habitation for man, some experiment in world-wide socialism, communism—call it what you like, government in which all participate equally for the equal good of all—must be attempted. And this is a fitting moment in the world's history in which to inaugurate the attempt.

§ 3

The most obvious means whereby to lessen the undue disparity in wealth which now prevails is to continue in times of peace the heavy tax upon large incomes which has been levied as a war measure. If it is desirable, for the sake of principle, that every one should pay a tax, that on incomes no more than sufficient to maintain a comfortable standard of living —which I should place at four or five thousand dollars a year for men with families—should be nominal only; above that amount the tax should be increasingly heavy until all incomes in excess of one hundred thousand dollars were virtually confiscated. It is a recognized principle of modern taxation that the burden should fall most heavily upon those best able

to pay. It should be increasingly recognized also that superlatively large incomes are a menace to society on the ground, simply, that few men are sufficiently wise to spend vast incomes without harm to themselves and to others. One hundred thousand dollars is an arbitrary figure but it seems to me sufficiently large more than to satisfy the legitimate wants of any human being.

Heavy inheritance taxes are, however, a more vital need than a large income tax. Vast fortunes invested in land, railroads, and utility corporations, rolling up through sheer momentum, added to by wealthy marriages, and passing by inheritance under trust provisions which safeguard the properties, have already created an aristocracy of wealth in this country. The phenomenon is so recent, the opportunities for acquiring great wealth so recently circumscribed, that we are scarcely yet aware that we have a propertied class no less firmly established than that of England. It is our popular belief that it requires but three generations to pass "from shirt-sleeves to shirt-sleeves," that wealth accumulated by the grandfather is dissipated by the grandsons. This is but rarely the case. Well established wealth perpetuates itself with little personal guidance. It grows with the development of society and those who inherit it are as secure, as well able to found families, as are the landed aristocracies of Europe. Class envy and class

warfare, so deprecated by our industrial and financial leaders, are created by the very solidity of the fortunes which they establish, and with the passing of every decade the opportunity of the exceptional few to pass from the lower classes into the freer life of the wealthy—that "democracy of opportunity" upon which we pride ourselves—is lessened.

The national confiscation of excessive wealth through income and inheritance taxes, is moreover necessary to furnish the means whereby our tremendous social problems may be met and solved and the standard of living of our industrial classes materially increased. Poverty and disease are, in the main, social ills springing from the interplay of complex economic forces unregulated by the state. They must be eradicated if our social system is to become healthy and our citizens competent to exercise the privileges of democratic government. Disease springs largely from poverty and ignorance, from bad housing, malnutrition, overcrowding, dangerous and unhealthful conditions of work—evils which can be eliminated by foresight and the expenditure of money. The nature of the problem, its cause and its remedy, is known, but the organization of forces necessary to its solution is only in its infancy. It is a national not a local problem and must be met by a strong centralized authority competent to deal with it in all its manifestations and devoting itself to that

end. Such power demands the surrender of state and municipal prerogatives which are jealously guarded in times of peace. But in time of war the federal government overrides local jealousies and conservatisms, and the administrative machinery and powers so achieved can be perpetuated and directed to remoter ends if the citizens have the wisdom to seize the opportunity and profit by their wartime experience.

Our social system presents an amusing or a depressing spectacle as one views it either with the eyes of the mind or the eyes of the heart. Its incongruities and barbarities shriek at one from every side. To one awakened to its absurdities, every daily contact affords food for satire. Thus two incidents of an afternoon's trip in the mountains of North Carolina seemed to me typical of our topsy-turvy civilization, though in themselves commonplace enough. On a picturesque mountain road we passed a woman, lean, brown, wrinkled, of indeterminable age. She was seemingly returning home from some illicit "moonshine" still, for as we passed in the motor-car she shrieked in a drunken raucous voice, "Let 'er fly!" The contrast of the pleasure seekers, paying a stiff price to view the beauties of mountain scenery, and the mountain dweller whose greatest happiness lay in forgetting her darkened existence in drunkenness, seemed to me ironic. A little later we

passed a wagon crawling homewards from town, drawn by a yoke of the little mountain cattle guided by a gaunt mountaineer. It was the same we had passed hours before when we set out on our journey. Meanwhile we had pleasurably and easily made a trip of forty miles, stopping when we chose to view the mountain laurel or a bend of the mountain stream dancing in its canyon bed. Surely the mountaineer driving to town with his load of wood and returning with his scant purchases should have driven the swift running motor-car while we crept behind the slow-paced oxen.

These are trivial epsiodes, striking one with their significance because of some strangeness in the setting or because one is in the mood to see. Our routine lives in cities offer more tragic contrasts which familiarity robs of their power to thrill. Children underfed and underclothed dying for lack of care and proper food, girls in the garment trades earning less than six dollars a week, while in ultra-fashionable circles women spend thousands of dollars in a single year for clothes and millinery, are instances of those extremes which enflame the anarchist and provoke class hatred. A speculator may make in a single turn of the market a sum greater than the total earnings of a competent bank-clerk in a working lifetime of fifty years. A man may "corner" wheat and from his fortune endow a university; may break a

strike, secure government contracts for armour-plate, and endow libraries; may exploit the riches of the earth in oil-wells and coal-mines and support a thousand foreign missionaries. It is all quite as mad as the hatter's tea-party. We have our theories, to be sure, that great rewards are necessary if we are to tempt our *entrepreneurs* to confer upon us the vast social benefit of their enterprise. I wonder if any one really believes such theories. They are only a justification of things as they are, an explanation after the fact.

The rich, who profit most from our social chaos, are also the victims of it. Self-defence provokes many a man in a financial corner to ruthless methods of which he is at heart ashamed. And wealth too often ruins those who inherit it, for in America there is no accompanying heritage of class obligation and social duty which to some extent has justified the existence of aristocracies in other lands. How, indeed, an intelligent, well meaning, and scrupulous young man, heir to great wealth, could dispose of his income without injury to someone is more than I can tell. No matter how good his intentions he could never be sure that the help he gave here would not pauperize or debase elsewhere. The income he spends may be in part derived from the very social injustice he seeks to rectify. Charity is useless and debasing. The only remedy for the ills of our social

system is social action, the state confiscating wealth and the services of men to the realization of a plan which deals comprehensively with disease, poverty, education, crime, and the standard of living of the entire nation. The efforts of individuals and institutions can serve at best only to ameliorate the suffering; it cannot get to the root of the disease and effect a cure.

These are truisms which the thinker and social worker have dinned into the unheeding ears of the world for half a century. My excuse for repeating them here is that their relation to democracy at home and to that international democracy upon which the world pins its faith and hope of survival is not clear to everyone, nor the peculiar necessity of seeing that relationship at this particular moment realized. A fine idealism is being generated by the world-war, an idealism which for the moment outweighs human selfishness. Men are giving their lives and their means to the service of their country. Out of the stress and necessity of the war a new machinery fitted to the establishment of a new social order is coming into being. To make use of this idealism and machinery is our opportunity and duty as we endeavour to establish a better relationship among the nations and destroy the evil of autocracy.

§ 4

Thus far I have endeavoured to suggest briefly some of the inadequacies of our national democracy, for it is my conviction that the growth of a democratic internationalism must be accompanied by domestic reforms. National boundaries do not express the sole lines of cleavage in our modern world; nor even perhaps, the deepest. Capitalism is not confined to a single state. It exists in all countries and its purpose is everywhere the same: to exploit the riches of the earth and to bring men in subjection to it. Warring groups within the exploiting class have utilized race hatreds and national rivalries to attain their ends. In the present war we see German capitalism, in control of the state and a strong military organization, seeking to extend its sway over the Balkans and Asia Minor and coveting the coal and iron mines of Belgium and northern France. But it has suffered in this war; less, to be sure, than the German people, who must bear the chief burden, but still sufficiently to demonstrate that war is a costly way of securing economic domination. Capital has suffered throughout the world and if it is at all wise it must have learned the lesson that co-operation is more profitable than war. We should, then, anticipate the fruits of this lesson in an effort of capitalism, upon the conclusion of the war, to utilize for the furtherance of

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its own best interests any international machinery which may be organized. Where war has failed, peaceful compromise and a pooling of interests may prove successful. The American railways learned this lesson after costly efforts to devour each other. The world is only a larger America, with the same possibilities of exploitation and profit. Capitalism will be stupid not to learn its lesson and profit therefrom.

We should, at the outset, anticipate a rapprochement of the commercial interests of the United States and Great Britain and an effort to adjust their rivalries in Mexico, South America, and China. They should aim to establish an international shipping trust for the control of the sea. German capital will probably be excluded at first from participation in the spoils. But German capital controls vast technical skill, particularly in the chemical industries, and must ultimately be propitiated if costly warfare is not again to ensue. Japan, likewise, is too powerful and occupies too favoured a place in the Orient to be crushed. Safety and profit will demand her inclusion in the international agreement.

The world will then be open to the exploitation by capital to an extent far greater than has hitherto been possible. One can imagine agreement as to methods of combating labour, of checking freedom of speech, of controlling the press, of allaying popular discontent

by tactful concessions. One can conceive of world-wide programs of social betterment whose end shall be to create a contented and efficient industrial class similar to that of Germany. To steal the program of the socialists, to anticipate popular pressure by yielding somewhat but without relinquishing control, should be the "enlightened policy" of the world financiers of the future.

Are these developments fanciful only, or do they pre-suppose a Machiavellian cleverness such as capitalism has never yet displayed? It is easy in retrospect to attribute to foresight and intelligence what is more truly the result of the hard knocks of experience and the necessity of compromise between forces of nearly equal strength. It is a mistake we are prone to commit when we survey the development of capitalistic industry and recognize the hold which it has upon us. In reality the capitalistic class is composed of men whose foresight is no greater than that of other men save as it has to do with profits. They are deficient in theory and blind to the larger social implications of their particular enterprise. But in business, which is a form of warfare, they have learned to respect strength, have found that it is better to effect a truce than to achieve an exhausting victory, and have a quick eye to utilize any chance aids which come their way. Their achievements are less swiftly realized than were they the result of

plan and intelligent prevision, but the ultimate result is much the same. Nor should we suppose them less intelligent than ourselves who speculate upon their motives and intentions. If war and rivalry mean waste, and waste means loss of profits, they should learn the lesson as well as we. And should they seize the machinery for national and international regulation of industry and seek to turn it to their profit, they will do only what we seek to do, albeit with a different purpose.

That any world alliance of the forces of capital could prevent social revolt, even though granting concessions to the workers, is doubtful. The intelligence of the world is not so easily controlled as its mines and rubber forests. But effective revolt can be long postponed if capital succeeds in intrenching itself behind international agreements and conducts its industries without too bitter economic oppression. Our concern is to prevent such immediate gain in power whatever our confidence in the triumph of democracy over autocracy. We should like to share in that triumph and not leave all its fruits to the enjoyment of posterity.

What measures, then, may we adopt to check this last metamorphosis of autocracy in its Protean forms? To have escaped from the terrors of German militarism into the clutches of world-wide capitalism will profit us little. True democracy, economic no less

than political, would be weakened thereby. The controlling power of the world would not be so apparent as before nor its abuses so gross, but it would be all the more formidable. We have in order to prevent such a consummation, to increase the democratic control of industry in England and the United States. In the United States this means federal ownership of, or direct participation of the government in the administration of, the railways, telegraph and telephone systems, the maintenance of the food dictatorship established under war conditions, and the taking over by the state for national development of mines, forests, and water power. The war is demonstrating that such an enlargement of governmental powers is feasible and the machinery to this end is much of it already in existence. The broad principles underlying the action can be simply put: those economic resources and industries vital to the national welfare should be under the nation's direct control in order to insure their just and equitable management. It has been suggested, also, that labour representatives should sit as members in the directorates of all corporations, an eminently reasonable procedure. And, further, there should be a minimum wage law which would insure a higher standard of living than now maintains.

Such government participation in industry is vital if we are ever to adjust production to consumption.

Our present competitive system is notoriously inefficient in this respect. Periods of over production alternate with periods of depression, periods of high wages and high prices with those of unemployment and low prices. It is a fearsomely hazardous system, productive of misery and dread. Nor are its evil effects purely national. Indirectly they are a contributing cause to international friction and wars. Over production necessitates the "dumping" of goods abroad at cost prices or even lower in order that prices at home may be maintained. This is a distinct injury to foreign producers and a legitimate cause of grievance. Ultimately the domestic production of the nations will need to be determined in part by national needs and in part by international agreement whereby it shall be determined how much goods shall be produced for interchange with other countries. Such an agreement will be necessary to equalize production, consumption, and prices throughout the world.

These proposed modifications of our industrial system though socialistic in trend are not state socialism. There would still remain a wide margin for individual initiative and enterprise. Whether initiative needs the spur of large prospective rewards experience alone can show. I do not believe it necessary, myself. I believe men work largely for the pleasure of achievement, self realization, the sense of power.

I am confident that some form of socialistic co-operation is the goal of our industrial society. But be this as it may, socialism cannot be achieved in a day and in realizing such a program as I have sketched there is sufficient to absorb our energies for some time to come. Are any of the suggested steps impracticable? I think not. Difficult they may be but all have been taken either here or abroad under the stress of war. What can be done in war can be better and more wisely done in peace.

Political changes must, however, prelude and accompany so great an economic revolution. The machinery for the popular control of government is now quite inadequate to its professed purpose. It is now freely admitted that the founders of our government were more democratic in theory than in fact, and our subsequent political history has been largely the effort of the people to thwart the professional politicians and the special interests in their attempt to control our political institutions. The successes have been sporadic and superficial rather than continuous and profound. The political boss is less crude than formerly but he still exists; and special interests are still potent to choose our representatives and to gain the ear of Congress, state legislature, and city council. Our political history is the record of periodic and petty revolution punctuated by stretches of popular apathy.

Yet popular revolt has achieved its victories. Senators are now elected by popular vote, many of our small cities have established efficient forms of government, and in a considerable number of states women are now entitled to vote and to hold office. The professional politician continues to throw monkey wrenches into the wheels of political progress but the car does move, though haltingly. Movements for the short ballot, the appointment rather than the election of judges, the referendum and recall, and the separation of state and municipal elections from national elections are gaining in strength. More important than these, perhaps, is the demand for proportional representation in legislative bodies whereby small groups may find a political voice. Various devices have been invented to this end and the adoption of some one of them seems imperative. Minority parties have only an indirect and slight influence upon legislation in our system as at present constituted. It is highly desirable that they be granted representation in proportion to the number of their adherents, and some form of preferential or group voting is necessary to this end.

Our present system expresses the tyranny of majorities or more often the tyranny of the strongest minority group. A member of Congress seldom represents a homogeneous constituency. He is a plurality choice of electors with various and opposed interests. All

of these he cannot represent and he chooses, therefore, to represent the strongest of the minority groups, not necessarily of the greatest numerical strength but greatest in power and influence. This is usually the propertied group which, consequently, is represented in our legislative bodies far more numerously than on the basis of numbers solely it is entitled to be. Labour interests suffer in inverse ratio, and we have the curious result that in Congress the labour interests are far less represented than in England or most of the continental countries. Labour legislation in this country is consequently primitive and unenlightened. If the impending governmental control of industry is to become democratic in its nature, extensive changes in our electoral machinery and methods seem, then, a prime requisite.

Strictly proportional representation would, of course, go far to transfer the class control of industry that now exists to the hands of the mass, for as I have been endeavouring to show it will be less possible in the future even than now to divorce political and economic issues. They are one and the same, and in a country whose institutions were genuinely democratic all economic legislation would necessarily aim at the welfare of the workers who constitute the majority of the citizens even though such legislation was at the expense of the propertied classes, which, in the main, it would inevitably be. Therefore all

liberal innovations in our political machinery have been fought by capitalism and will continue so to be fought while our present system of industrial warfare and class rivalry persists. But it is for this same reason that men of liberal leanings, who believe in the mission of democracy, must unite to secure it the means to demonstrate its fitness to control our society both in political and economic institutions. Political democracy leads ultimately to economic equality, though the road may be long. Autocracy in wealth is its inevitable foe. Their ends can never be the same.

In the world of real things rather than political and economic theory, among people of mixed impulses and confused thinking, the essential antagonism of democracy in politics and industry, on the one hand, with privilege, wealth, and autocracy on the other is seldom clearly perceived. A man benefiting from monopoly and privilege may give his wealth freely in a war of democratic peoples with a military autocracy. He may even spend his time and money to secure the election of honest and competent legislators or to effect an improvement in political machinery. He does not perceive that his power to profit from his fellow citizens is due to their political inability to curb that power. Nor if the issue were clear would all those who enjoy privilege cling to it and do all in their power to thwart democracy. The

leaders in the fight for freedom have often been men of means and position desirous of destroying the very conditions which make possible their preferred position. Our economic system, with the premium which it places upon selfishness and its extremes of poverty and wealth, happily neither destroys all altruism in the rich nor all kindliness and charity in the poor. And we can anticipate, in a better social order in which self-preservation is no longer only another name for selfishness, that the better qualities of human nature will have freer opportunity to flourish.

If the questionable success of democracy in America be alleged as a ground for disbelief in democracy as a theory of government, the cause is insufficient. If our institutions have failed to realize their pretensions to popular representation and control, the reason for this condition is not inherent in the democratic principle but in the conditions of American life. We have hitherto considered our industrial and our political life as separate and distinct. We have failed to perceive their vital interdependence. We have elected representatives not to guide our social and industrial progress but to carry on the minimum of government necessary to national defence and the operation of our courts of justice. We have acted on the belief that a man's chief duty was to make a living and that this was best achieved by free industrial competition. We have conceived it to be the

government's business, so far as possible, to keep hands off.

With such a conception of the subordinate place of government in our lives, it is no wonder that our representatives have too often been men incompetent to deal with social and economic problems, men who have made a business of office holding and whom the electors responsible for their election have regarded more with amusement than with serious interest and concern. Let it once be recognized that the function of the state is not narrowly political but primarily economic, and the American citizen will make politics, as he has hitherto made business, the chief concern of life. Those who profit by things as they are have for a long time past made the politics of obstruction their serious business. Those who are to profit by things as they should be will have to make the politics of economic reorganization their main interest.

That Americans already perceive the serious nature of politics and its relation to our material well being is evident, I think, from our recent history and is apparent in our tentative efforts to meet the seriousness of the labour situation by political action. Until recently our labour classes have been on the whole, better off than similar classes in England notwithstanding the more intelligent industrial legislation in England than in the United States. The standard of

living here has been relatively high, the opportunity for advancement, greater. But this condition has been due to the happy accidents of economic position, particularly to the vast areas of cheap and fertile lands which have served to keep wages high. Certainly whatever privileges and advantages labour has enjoyed have not been the product of legislative foresight and wisdom, and now that the conditions which produced them have largely disappeared, the free lands put under cultivation and the labour market flooded with immigrant workers, American labour is losing its preferred position. That this is so is evident in the growing intensity of the struggle between capital and labour, the effort of manufacturers' associations to break the power of the unions and that of organized labour to hold its place. And despite the successes of some of the stronger unions, successes due in large part to abnormal war-time conditions, the position of organized labour looks to an outsider very precarious. Large industry feels now as never before the solidarity of its interests. Industrial leaders believe as formerly in their "right to run their own business," and unless the government steps in to regulate industrial conditions they bid fair to attain their purpose more effectually than ever before.

Ways of warfare are also being improved, for though the old brutal methods of rifle and strike

breaker are still resorted to, employers are learning that other methods are less wasteful, arouse less popular protest, and are, in the end, more efficacious. They have discovered, some of them, that contented workers, moderately well paid, comfortably housed, and promised pensions for a lifetime of faithful service do more and better work than employés who are discontented, made to work too long hours, and forced to live under conditions which reduce their physical strength and endurance. Profit sharing and bonus systems have also been introduced in some industries. And insofar as these enlightened methods have raised the standard of living they are good. Insofar, however, as they have weakened labour organizations and reduced labour's power of collective bargaining they are inimical to a democratic society. Democracy demands that the workers be a power in determining the conditions of industry and sharing in its profits. A working population kept innocuous through tactful concessions in hours and wages but weakened thereby in its power to organize and intimidated by fear of losing a job or the prospect of a pension, is one that men of liberal principles cannot contemplate without grave concern.

The most dangerous situation for American labour is improved working conditions bought at the price of a weakened organization and consequent diminished industrial and political power. And it is perhaps a

fortunate thing for the welfare of the country that enlightened methods of industrial warfare do not prevail so widely that the people as a whole are wooed to a sense of security and made forgetful of the unsolved problems of democratic economy. Flagrant examples of the industrial tyranny exercised by capital are signalized by the recent strikes in the Michigan mining district and in Bayonne, New Jersey. Of the first, and the impossible conditions and injustice which led ignorant unskilled foreign labour of several races to effect a crude organization and revolt, no word that I have read was printed in our newspapers. Of the Bayonne strike, reports deliberately falsified were printed in the New York papers. But such methods are short-sighted. The truth creeps out somehow and makes the average citizen profoundly cynical of corporation methods and sceptical of the news that he reads in the commercialized press.[1]

Yet more mediaeval in method and perhaps more influential in stirring public opinion have been the occasional attempts to discredit trade-unionism by convicting labour leaders of homicides or attempted homicides engineered by capitalistic groups. These bespeak a barbarism as great as that existing in Rus-

[1] The report of the President's Mediation Commission with its astonishing revelation of the high-handed stupidity of mine owners in Arizona and of the lumbermen in the Northwest; affords excellent and more recent instances of industrial anarchy deliberately misrepresented in our press.

sia previous to the revolution. Indeed the striking garment workers in Chicago, young Russian girls many of them, unjustly arrested and charged by mounted police while peacefully picketing during a recent strike, denounced the police as Cossacks. It is a novel idea to Americans that refugees from foreign tyranny should find in America the same brutal methods of oppression that prevailed in their own country.

Yet these exaggerated instances of capitalistic brutality and blindness serve the excellent purpose of reminding us that the problem of capital in its relation to labour is unsolved and that civil war exists within the state. It is inconceivable that such conditions can be much longer tolerated. The lessons in federal control which we are learning in the present war should teach us to suppress such anarchy, and, more, so to alter industrial conditions that they shall henceforth be determined by guiding principles of justice formulated by the people. Before the United States entered the war it seemed probable that the conclusion of the peace would find us the least advanced, the least liberal of the civilized peoples. All western Europe and Russia were learning at a terrible price the lesson that democracy must be efficient to combat autocracy successfully. Essential to that efficiency have been state control of wages, hours, and working conditions of the workers, and of the relations of em-

ployer and employed. Wealth and industrial organizations have been conscripted no less than fighting men. We too, perhaps, must pay the price to learn our lesson. But here and abroad the lesson will mean little if not learned once and for all and the measures of control devised in war times continued after the peace. But with this profound difference: that the administrative machinery be no longer in the hands of a dictator but be subject to the popular will. If the nations fail to perpetuate their administrative machinery and to devise means for its popular control *things* will again assume dominance over men, and autocracy, in one form or another, persist.

This is the time to do much. The reformer and idealist who formerly demanded these changes and was cried down as an impractical dreamer has been justified by the fact. He can point to what has been done as proof that a better political and industrial organization is feasible. If we have but the sense to realize it a newer society with Utopian possibilities is in our hands to do with what we will. Uncontrolled by democratic ideals the organization we have achieved will either dissolve into its old warring elements or, more probably, be diverted to autocratic uses. We owe it to those who survive this war, and even more to those who have died, to perpetuate in the terms of peace and in our national betterment thereafter the lessons in justice and democracy which

the war has taught. We must demonstrate that a federation of genuinely free peoples can be the outgrowth of a war of tyranny and terribleness upon the idealism of man.

IV

THE NEW SOCIAL MORALITY

THE new internationalism, relying as it must, at the outset, in part upon an international police and the threat of force to maintain order and prevent aggression, can hope for success only as that force is exercised justly and as the smaller nations share increasingly in its control. England, France, and the United States must needs anticipate the democratization of the international ruling body by the voluntary curtailment of their power and influence. Such a surrender of power for the good of the greatest number, essential as it is to a truly democratic federation of the world, will demand a greater unselfishness among the nations, a more complete surrender of that false pride of race and the narrow patriotism which we now know than history has yet witnessed. Only through this voluntary relinquishment of power, however, can the fatal belief in imperial destiny and the divine right to rule be quenched. It is conceivable that these national obsessions may die out, in a saner world, with a freer interchange of thought and a closer political

organization than at present exists; but if this is to be so, national self-consciousness, racial vanity, and the restricted patriotism of our day must no longer be kept alive by commercial profits fostered by political prestige. As surely as a league to enforce peace becomes a league of commercially powerful nations exploiting the rest of the world to its profit, so certainly will democratic world organization be checked at its inception. The desire for profits when added to racial enmities and national jealousies is too great a force for idealism to overcome. Therefore economic democracy must accompany political democracy.

Such a relinquishment of the desire for world power in trade demands in the individual nations, as we have seen, an economic reorganization aiming at the democratic control of all the forces of the state, the checking of capitalism, and the relinquishment by the powerful few of their present ideals of exploitation. It demands that standards of living be raised, that poverty and disease be eradicated, and that human equality as we have defined it be secured in far greater degree than we now know. Apparently, then, this change in national ideals and the consequent destruction of international rivalries demands an enlargement of our social morality as manifested in our economic society today.

But the higher social morality which is displacing

the older individual codes already exists in more than rudimentary form. It has been developing throughout the last hundred years. In the last twenty it has grown with marvellous rapidity, preparing the way for vast social changes of which we have as yet only scattered hints in actual institutions. It seems probable that the war will do much to disseminate the ideals of this morality yet farther. The war touches in every capacity the lives of the nations engaged, influencing peasant and artisan no less than king and warlord. The millions of men under arms will return to their homes with a new discontent with the old order and its injustices, inequalities, and brutalities. From this society of ours has sprung war and all its horror and agony. It is inconceivable that men should henceforth be content with their old ways.

The discontent engendered by the war is manifest. Revolt in Russia, revolution in China and the East, the demands of labour in all industrial states are but surface indications of a world-wide unrest. Even more significant is the religious tone of the literature of the day. Men are examining their beliefs. Conventional acceptances, a superficial orthodoxy, do not suffice the human soul in hours of agony and loss. The war has brought us face to face with poignant realities and we need a new religion and a new morality if we are to endure the vision of them. The old religion of other-worldliness with its justifica-

tion of things as they are, inequalities and suffering being imposed by an infallible God for disciplinary purposes, is a poor solace to men and women suffering the agonies of this war. A God who should decree such pain is not one in whom they can believe. No heavenly recompense, no ethical gain from suffering can justify the pain of life to them.

They ask of religion that it aid them to refashion the world into a place tolerable to human existence. They ask a God who needs their aid, not one who demands their submission. Life proves so inconceivably horrible in time of war, so far beneath the aspirations of all men, that they turn savagely upon the whole order of their existence resolved to sweep away the pack of lies and half truths taught by religion, education, and social tradition. Nor are there lacking ideals for a new social order, a loftier morality, and nobler conceptions of God than of one who, for an inscrutable purpose, dooms the greater part of mankind to misery in times of peace and to agony in times of war.

The root ideal of the new order of human life we know as democracy, if we think of it in political terms; as universal brotherhood, if our point of view is economic; and as pantheism if our interest is theological. Politically the ideal demands that every man and woman have an equal voice in the management of human society for the welfare of all. Those

who administer the government do so as representatives of the mass and are elected by it. This ideal is so widespread and its further dissemination is so certain that no more need be said of it. But the necessity, for its realization, that our social and economic aims be altogether altered, and back of this our individual morality and conception of God is not so clear. We do not always see that a political democracy is possible only in a society which knows no great disparities in wealth and in which the ambitions and desires of the individual are not primarily economic. Nor do we always realize that God can no longer be conceived of as a remote and distant force enslaving men for his obscure purposes, but the larger all-embracing consciousness of the world realizing his aims through the willing co-operation of men. The chain must be complete if men are to be bound to worthy action, international and national ideals finding their strength in individual morality, which derives its inspiration from an immanent God.

The ambitions of most men in our day are to acquire property in order that they may have freedom of movement, bodily ease, opportunity to marry whom they choose, and leisure for the gratification of tastes and aptitudes. The end they seek is some vague freedom, some hazy happiness. But so great is the struggle for the attainment of the means that the end is seldom realized. Even those who secure

independence find that the effort has exhausted their energy or diverted their very interest to money getting. In the effort to acquire they fail to learn how to spend. They are unfitted to enjoy art and literature or to learn from travel and social intercourse. The cultivation of the arts becomes the collecting of pictures, first editions, and fine bindings. Social life becomes competitive ostentation—"conspicuous waste." The man who has both the means and the taste to make his life an instance of what life at its best may be is very rare.

That many men now, and ultimately all men, should live finely, economic security must be made universal. There is inevitable work in the world, for we must be fed and clothed, and this work must be shared. But toil is not good in itself. Possibly there is moral and spiritual value to be got from digging in the earth and watching things grow from one's labour. But when one must work ten and twelve hours a day in good weather and bad there is left no margin for spiritual experience and mental enjoyment. Toil is a necessity only, and the aim of society is to make it bear lightly upon all. Creative work, done for the joy of making, the work of the artist and craftsman, is another thing. It is recreation not toil. If the accumulated wealth of the world were divided more equitably and if the vast waste and reduplication of effort in our chaotic eco-

nomic system were eliminated, the hours of toil required of us all could be vastly reduced, how much only the experiment itself can reveal. Then the practice of the arts and crafts, and the refinement of social intercourse would be our chief concern and interest. In these we should find the means to a finer and more joyous way of life.

The development of machine industry in the last century came too soon and too rapidly for its best social utilization. Here as in other instances—notably the scientific warfare of our day—human inventions outstripped institutional and moral development. The tremendous increase in the world's wealth made possible by the use of machinery was under no social control. Society at the end of the eighteenth century was, economically, much as it had been since the beginning of time, a struggle for survival little regulated or ameliorated by the state. The moral code justified a man in securing all the wealth he could get and expending it as he chose. He exacted the highest prices for his product that he could secure; he paid his workman no more than he must. The economic theories of the *laissez faire* system were developed to explain the facts as they existed. Workers in free competition for jobs, producers competing freely—freedom was the political catchword of the day, and therefore the economist labelled the competitive system then existing as *free.*

How empty is such freedom we have learned to our cost in the last one hundred years. The state has increasingly been forced to interfere, restricting capital in its uses and ameliorating the condition of labour—to no great extent in either case, but somewhat. And meanwhile our social morality has slowly altered, a fact made evident by the distaste we feel for the industrial warfare of our time. That warfare is frequently as barbarous as in 1840 in the factory towns of the north of England; so too is the warfare in the trenches in Flanders as barbarous as that of the Napoleonic era. But the moral protest of the world in both instances is vastly stronger and more universal than it was a hundred or even fifty years ago. The conviction is growing that both war and industrial strife can and must be prevented. Dimly we perceive that our ideals of nationality and international rivalry have all been wrong. Dimly we realize that the industrial warfare of our day is likewise a survival from barbaric times.

The newer social morality demands that our industrial arena be something other than a gladiatorial circus wherein Christian folk are slaughtered by the mercenaries. It would do away with economic rivalry and "survival of the fittest," and place land and those products of the earth essential to human subsistence within the control of the state for the good of all. Excessive and irksome toil it looks upon as

an evil remediable by a little human foresight, ingenuity, and goodwill. It is feasible that every human being should have ample of the necessaries of life in return for a few hours of work daily under wholesome conditions. That the problem of industrial re-organization is a complicated and difficult one does not make its solution the less imperative. Nor is it a task too great for human intelligence provided we attack it with sufficient fervour. Problems almost as difficult are being solved today under the stress of war. The greatest obstacle to it is that the most powerful among us lack as yet an idealism sufficiently compelling to enforce what they falsely conceive to be a great personal sacrifice.

For an economic democracy presupposes the confiscation of vested wealth to state control, or the voluntary surrender of wealth from motives of patriotism and goodwill. It is conceivable that patriotism may come to mean this, the free offering in times of peace, no less than in times of war, of property and human services to the needs of the state. It is only the logical enlargement of an altruistic motive of great power in human life. In times of war and national peril whole nations, like communities devastated by fire or earthquake, sink their differences of class and caste and offer their lives and property to the common weal. Much of the selfishness which is the natural product of our economic system in times of peace is

forgotten. And from this surrender of self and personal ambitions there is born a feeling of community interest, of brotherhood, which in the eyes of some goes far to justify war. Those who remain at home feel something of the soldier's pride in his corps, something of his sense of comradeship with his fellow soldiers. But when the moment of peril is over, the passion for brotherly helpfulness slowly fades, men relapse into their old rivalries and jealousies, and patriotism becomes again a conventional and meaningless sentiment.

The ability to forget rivalries and jealousies and work for a common cause, and the feeling of brotherhood which comes from such devotion, are forces which we should seek to utilize not rarely in times of war but constantly in times of peace. If, at the height of their patriotic ardour, men could be made to see that human brotherhood is the most desirable and possible of conditions they would be moved to offer themselves to the constructive work of peace as for the destructive work of war. But only as some such moment of high feeling is seized by the leaders of the nations will society make that sudden leap from its present state of semi-barbarism to a civilization commensurate with its best ideals. Such a moment will be the coming peace when, with the sacrifices of the war still vividly before them, men will pause an instant before resuming the pursuits of normal life

and ask themselves why such horrors need ever be repeated. That will be the time to turn men's thoughts to the problem of altering the world into something more generous, finer, more truly expressive of their better selves.

War, with all its recrudescence of primitive passions and savagery is not truly expressive of men. They look with horror upon the thing they have made and cannot undo. Nor is our civilization in times of peace truly expressive of men. It is less generous than they, more heartless and unfeeling. Like war, our industrial society with its cruelties and oppressions is a vast and terrible mechanism, so strong and complicated that individual men feel helpless to remake it upon saner and juster lines. Only when, as in war, men are moved by overwhelming emotion are they able to free themselves from the heritage of the past and work freely to the accomplishment of a common end. For the transformation demanded in peace a wave of religious emotion would be the most fitting medium. But to this we can hardly look hopefully in the present stage of the world, not at least to such religious emotion as we have known in the past. But that the leaders of the world should, at the peace, call upon the latent altruism and goodwill of men that exists in all, irrespective of religious affiliations, would accomplish much. An appeal to the rich and the powerful to forego selfish ambitions and

aid the state to social betterment would go far to guide civilization into new paths, would perhaps remould our society, for the rich no less than the poor are unable to find genuine happiness in the world which we know.

Those sensitive to modern ideals, growingly conscious of the needs of their fellows, as all men of fine feeling must be today, know that only as the society about them is freed from injustice and suffering can they as individuals, no matter what their wealth and freedom, find happiness. The modern world differs profoundly in this respect from the Athenian state to which we look for much of our inspiration in literature and art. Athens was based upon slavery, and the leisurely debates of philosophers and finely fashioned statues and temples were made possible only by the economic servitude of the masses. That this was so did not then disturb the thinker and artist. The men of gold were divinely constituted to rule the men of baser metals. And all highly cultivated societies from the age of Pericles until our own have been moved little if at all by the miserable and restricted lives of those beneath them. It is no longer so. The temper of the time, the widening of the social consciousness will not permit artist or thinker to dwell apart oblivious of those who furnish him with food and leisure. Too many poems like *The Song of the Shirt* and *The Cry of the Chil-*

dren have been written to enable him to forget the sweatshop and the cottonmill. The literature, art, and philosophy of his time are saturated with allusions to social problems. If he lives a life of self-gratification, however lofty, he is forever haunted by the shadow of those without his cloistered peace, those who lack what is his. And so he can never find happiness or serenity in a world such as ours. Nor will sensitive men ever find happiness and serenity until our world is altered. Christianity, or whatever the moving force may be, has made us aware of our kinship with all men, and our landless cousins who sit at our gates can never be banished from our thoughts, try as we may to exorcise them.

That this is so is evident even in slight contacts with stupid wealthy people; much more with those of finer grain. One hears the casual well-to-do tourist and pleasure seeker or the snobbish social climber forever protesting against reformers, trade unions, labour leaders, socialists, radical writers and leaders —he calls them demagogues and agitators. He will introduce the topic when you least desire it and bore you with his primitive views. And he does it, I think, not because he is haunted by a fear of dispossession or anticipates that he will be held accountable as an unfit steward of his goods, but because of some obscure prick of conscience which irritates and torments him he knows not clearly why. He does not

know how to do other than he does, but the impulse to make some surrender is there. He is in the state of mind of the blackguard and wife-beater whom Shaw depicts in *Major Barbara,* loathing his way of life and hating those who would convert him. Only a very thick-skinned person can be insensitive to this spirit of our time, while those of fine feeling must always be unhappy even in the pursuit of the finest things in life so long as the freedom they enjoy is not a freedom shared equally by all.

Perhaps it is because of this conviction of sin that the wealthy classes of our day produce nothing of worth in art, or thought, or literature. Yet less have they achieved that noble manner of life, in itself the finest of arts, which redeemed somewhat the aristocracies of other ages. No aristocracy will ever again attain noble living, for noble spirits no longer believe in aristocracy. They devote their lives to the effort which has seemed so long hopeless of bringing light to the dark places and giving to all men those opportunities of life which in a happier world they would themselves seek to enjoy. This is an added reason, perhaps the greatest, why at this crisis in the world's history, the best thought and feeling of the age may if rightly guided, be turned to the destruction of our social evils. Men are not lacking now who realize that only as all men find freedom and opportunity for happiness is true freedom and hap-

piness possible to any one. The social consciousness of our age will not permit us to feel otherwise.

§ 2

The sensitiveness of the modern soul to the woes of white men and black whether in the slums of London and New York or in the rubber forests of the Congo is an acknowledgment of human kinship the world over. It does not necessarily imply the recognition of the political and economic equality of all men—for this is an intellectual rather than an emotional conception. But it is a recognition of their spiritual equality, their equal, because infinite, value to the World Spirit. It is a curious thing, this recognition of spiritual kinship. Those who feel it most keenly are often not religious people, are indeed unbelievers in the conventional sense that they are members of no church and have no interest in dogma. Yet were this emotion to be rationalized and explained in theological or metaphysical terms we should premise as a unifying whole in which all men have a part a World Spirit for whom we have no intelligible name but God.

A God who sums up in himself all the lesser souls of men, whom we know best as we respond with sympathy to the sorrows and joys of humanity, is a God different from the God of history and theological dispute. He is closer to us, for we feel him in our

hearts; we do not fear him in the anathemas of priests. He is not the lawgiver and judge, formidable and remote, of Hebrew tradition. He is something more intimate even than a spiritual father compassionating and suffering for the sins and errors of his children. He has a part in us and we are a part of him. We must feel that our hopes are his also, our failures his. We must feel that our desire for a better world, a kingdom of heaven upon earth, is his dream also. And we must feel with a profound conviction the necessity of aiding God to attain his vision, believing that he works only through us and is dependent upon our co-operation with his purposes.

God, so conceived, is no vague first cause, no mere name for necessity. He is not omnipotent. He is the sum of life, and the modern man conceives of the life force as a persistent, patient, but finite and restricted power seeking to express itself in finer and more varied forms of life that overcome the restrictions of matter and necessity in an ever urgent aspiration for greater freedom; which learns by experience, and despite setbacks struggles upward towards some goal never wholly achieved because always reformulated in finer terms as lesser goals are attained and passed.

Such a God is not omnipotent but must war upon recalcitrant matter and bend it to his purposes. He is not free but attains ever greater freedom through

effort and travail. We must think of him as a personality like ourselves, suffering with us and learning from our experience but with a finer and more ample vision than we individually possess. We can feel ourselves grow closer to him in prayer and in compliance with our sense of duty. We can renew our strength as we feel confidence in his enduring purpose. We can feel a sense of fellowship with him as we learn to love our fellowmen, and a growth in freedom as we struggle to attain it. Our hell is our failure to attempt the realization of our best possibilities; our heaven only a sense of growth and progress and closer affiliation with God in his attainment of his ends.

A God who is not omnipotent nor inscrutable but who realizes his aspirations only imperfectly and slowly, like ourselves, is a necessity to the modern man, never more so than today when to conceive of God as voluntarily decreeing the horrors of the present war would be to alienate him altogether from the possibility of human love and trust. A God who could so decree would be no other than a devil to us, try as theologians might to exonerate him on the plea of inscrutable purposes and man's restricted vision. It is a God intelligible to man that is our present necessity and such a God must be fallible though aspiring, of limited powers but persistent and patient, working through us but also dependent upon us.

To the sceptical modern world Christ is wholly intelligible only as a man of great spiritual insight, great sympathy with suffering, a seer who held the vision of a regenerated world, the Kingdom of Heaven upon earth. When Christ is thought of as divine his teaching and his suffering mean nothing to us. If Christ is thought of as a man they become real and show the possibilities of human sympathy and sacrifice. Christ was a reformer consumed with a passion to relieve the misery of the world and to set men upon the path of righteousness and freedom. He wished to found a new social order based upon equality and justice. Two thousand years after his execution the world is realizing the simple and practical truth of his teachings.

This recognition of a more human Christ comes from those outside the churches, the unorthodox—though the spread of this conception has of late altered somewhat the conventional teachings of orthodoxy. Institutional religion is, however, notoriously hostile to innovation and jealous of its authority. Though it has played a notable part in political history by reason of its wealth and temporal power, it has never espoused the theory that its functions were primarily earthly and human rather than other worldly and spiritual. It has utilized social institutions for its own ends but has never considered it the function of the church to alter social and

political institutions to keep pace with an advancing morality. Its moral teaching has, in short, been personal rather than social. Seldom has it been an instrument of reform. When not ostensibly assuming a neutral position it has actively opposed progressive movements, both political and economic.

Thus it is that radicals, idealists, and men of progressive spirit are to be found mostly without the pale of the church and have come to regard the church as an institution surviving from another day, one which must be torn down before the world can be reorganized upon better and freer lines. This is unfortunate, for the world has need today of spiritual guidance and a haven of consolation and strength. But what consolation can the church as we know it offer to men? It tells them to turn their thoughts upon another world. It offers a God omnipotent and just who can yet approve, because he ordains, life as men know it. Men ask a God as sensitive, as kindly, and as just as themselves. Him they find in their hearts, if at all, and whatever formal deference they may pay to creed and ritual is due to habit rather than to any expectation of spiritual profit.

The Church fails because it lags behind rather than leads the moral development of society. Its morality is that of a primitive people, not of a complicated industrial society. The ten commandments are no more an adequate guide to social conduct than would

the Code of Hammurabi suffice the Supreme Court of the United States in passing judgment upon a conspiracy in restraint of trade. The man of today wishes light upon child labour, socialism, birth control, woman's suffrage—a host of pressing issues, political to be sure but also moral, for they must be decided not upon the ground of expediency only but upon that of right and justice. "Thou shalt not covet anything that is thy neighbour's" can be made to mean that a man should be content with an insufficient wage and be satisfied in that position in life to which God has called him. It is difficult to extract any wider implication from it if one's moral aim is social rather than narrowly personal.

Whether consciously or no, organized religion has for the most part aligned itself with the powers of this world rather than with the spiritual forces of the invisible world. It is opposed to radicalism in all its forms as expressive of spiritual aspirations foreign to the churchly tradition. Of the rich it asks financial support and a conventional family morality. But upon the more difficult question of the obligation of wealth to the state or the yet more difficult justification of wealth in private hands it casts no light. It has failed to see that human morality is a growth, that it must alter with a changing world. The moral codes that were adequate to a primitive people or to the feudal age are no longer sufficient.

These are obvious truths and are perceived as such by many communicants and even by an appreciable number of ministers and priests, too few, however, to determine the character of the church as an institution. Its spiritual power today is warped by its traditions, by its dependence upon the financial support of the rich, by the respectable character of its congregations, and most of all perhaps, by its racial and national limitations. Greek, Roman, Lutheran, and English churches do not unite to teach the brotherhood of man and the spiritual kinship of Prussian, Slav, Frenchman, and Jew. The clergy of Germany pray for the destruction of the enemy and the triumph of German arms. And the clergy of America pray for the overthrow of Germany. Like the tariff, God is a "local issue."

To idealists little concerned with the Church's ultimate failure or success, because convinced that finer ideals will one day rule the world whether or no the church accepts or rejects them, it is nevertheless disappointing that the church at such a time as now shows so little aptitude for leadership. The majority of the citizens in the warring nations are members of some church. They are conventional "average" people, respecting the great tradition of the church and looking a bit wistfully to priest and minister for spiritual guidance. They wish to see the way to peace upon earth and good will toward men. And

the church, if it had but the vision to reply to this need in honest terms freed of all pietistic phrasing, could do inexpressibly much at such a time of moral questioning as this to turn men's thoughts to brotherhood and love rather than to hate; to a constructive hope rather than to hateful memories and despair. If the church is ever again to be a moral guide to progress, not a check upon it, it can ask no greater opportunity than that of today in which to show its possibilities for leadership.

Consider first the international changes which the church must anticipate and welcome if it is to become something more than a parochial institution. The Christian world is divided into a considerable number of churches, some with communicants all over the world, others coterminous with single states, and many—offshoots of the larger parent church—of relatively small size and restricted influence. Yet all profess the same source of inspiration: the life of Christ as narrated in the New Testament. All believe in a God, however variously defined and with what not mystical attributes and powers. All profess, too, to bring men nearer to God and to enable them to lead better lives. With this much in common there seems no sane reason for their hostility one to another. What sensible modern person is concerned with the nature of the baptismal ceremony or indeed whether or no such a ceremony exist. It is

ritualistic merely. In itself it has no spiritual value, is at most a symbol, significant to some, meaningless to others. And so with all the multitudinous differences in creed, ritual, dress, and what not. These are harmless enough save as they serve like differences in speech, dress, manners, and customs among nations to divide men and to perpetuate their ancient jealousies and antagonisms. The church, which has taught the fatherhood of God and, by implication, the brotherhood of man must needs keep pace with the modern world which desires greater political unity. The church should anticipate this union by a closer religious organization of the Christian nations, a preliminary to the religious union of all nations, Christian and non-Christian.

There have been tentative movements towards such a union among churches of not too divergent a ritual and system of control, but a complete and effective union in which all shall lay aside much that is peculiar and individual for the more effective emphasis upon what is truly essential and common to all seems now less imminent than the political federation of nations. For churches share not only racial and national animosities and jealousies but add thereto the extreme conservatism of wealth and tradition; and each is convinced that only through adherence to its particular formulae are salvation and righteousness to be achieved. Perhaps some great revival of religious

feeling such as animated Christendom at the time of the first crusade may sweep away all the old meaningless barriers. But such a revival is unpredictable. The war might possibly generate it. But it remains a hope, only, not a likelihood.

Great as are the obstacles to the world union of the Christian churches, yet more difficult will be the federation of religions the world over and the recognition of their equality in the eyes of that God whom all alike seek to know. This acknowledgment would be but another extension of the democratic principle whose realization we seek. It would not mean necessarily that Christianity was ethically no higher than Mohammedanism, nor Confucianism than Buddhism. It would mean merely this, that the adherents of all religions should be equally free to worship as they chose and be subject to no political or other pressure to change their way of thinking. The higher religion will displace the lower only as it is needed and sought. Conversion of savage peoples to Christianity is usually meaningless, for only in exceptional instances does the savage convert understand the meaning of the religion he professes. Much better would be his adoption of some religion only a bit in advance of that to which he was born, one not too opposed to the habits and customs he has always known. So it is recognized in many quarters that Mohammedanism is a better means of raising the African savage in the

scale of civilization than is Christianity. Likewise the practice of the wisest missionaries in training the native peoples to the best in their primitive religions before seeking to convert them to Christianity, is evidence of the growing charity and wisdom of the world—or of a small corner of it.

If the world is to know a better relationship among the nations, and if all are to be masters of their destiny, free to grow as they will so long as they do not encroach upon others, the Christian churches must renounce all effort to proselytize when their presence among alien peoples is not requested. If Christianity is truly the superior to all other beliefs, let the lives of Christians demonstrate as much. Hindoo, Chinaman, and Jap will seek Christianity of themselves when the white race has aroused their reverence and admiration. Then we shall have no need of missionaries, nor the backing of battleships and punitive expeditions. Christianity will spread by reason of its own inherent worth. Conversion by the sword is an aid to economic conquest but not to spiritual enlightenment.

These are radical concessions for the Christian churches to make if they are to become leaders in the democratization of the world. Greater yet must be their regeneration if they are to assume constructive leadership in the social morality of our day. Where before the church has taught a personal and tradi-

tional morality and has been hostile to innovation it will need to be revolutionary in its social teachings, affirming religion, politics, and economics to be inseparable, to be in fact but different ways of regarding man in his relations with his fellows.

In some of the Protestant churches clergymen have felt it their duty to preach upon civic affairs, have taken a hand in politics and been leaders in movements for "reform." But for the most part, clergymen and the church vote, the "good people," are easily hoodwinked by the professional politician. The reason is simple enough: their moral code is too primitive to be adequate to the complexity of modern conditions. The "respectable" candidate whose family life is stainless and who is a declared foe of the saloon will win their votes even though he is hand in glove with public utility corporations and the "big interests." The candidate who declares for a "closed town" may wink at franchise grabs and be a friend to graft. A morality so simple that it thinks the saloon the root of all evil and a conventional sex morality the chief virtue in a candidate for office is of little practical value to the cause of righteousness in our political life.

This reliance upon a primitive moral code and naïve faith in the promises of politicians are inexcusable today, for any one who can read can learn the patent fact that our politics are corrupt for the reason

that our political machinery, subject to the pressure of private interests, ceases to do the work for which it was designed: to fulfil the wishes of the people. And from this failure springs a multitude of evils—inequitable taxation, poor housing inspection, defective health measures, poor transit service—inefficiency and waste on every hand, the price a community pays for surrendering its liberties to a political machine and those who profit therefrom. Though all this is obvious enough, is written in the history of any political campaign in our larger cities, the respectable people do not seem to learn. Yet out of this corruption and perversion of democracy spring the veritable carnal sins which churches seem to regard as their chief enemy. A simple illustration will serve.

In the psychopathic laboratory of the Juvenile Detention Home in Chicago, delinquent girls are examined and committed to various reformatory institutions. Many of the girls when released are reformed, truly desirous, if permitted, of leading respectable lives. Yet the attendants at the home declared recently that their work was largely useless for the reason that the girls were enticed into their old ways by keepers of brothels. Appeals to the police to suppress the brothels were of no avail, for the "business administration," the "reform mayor," ostensibly the foe to the saloon, permitted a wide-open town. This mayor had been supported in his

candidacy by hundreds of clergymen because, forsooth, he had declared that it would be his first act as mayor to enforce the Sunday closing law. This conventional bait had won him thousands of respectable but unintelligent votes.

The instance demonstrates merely that people to whom Sunday observance is a prime political and moral issue are easy game for the politician. But it is an ominous instance, for ministers and church people must show far better moral judgment than this if they are to do their part in achieving a genuine democracy. The sin which churches seek to overcome is most of it not born of innate depravity, "original sin," but of social conditions. It is due to bad housing, insufficient food, a corrupt environment, bad home training by overworked and underpaid parents, deficient education, child labour, too little opportunity for wholesome recreation—innumerable evils which prey on body and soul and lead girls into vice and boys into crime. If the churches honestly pursue sin—such obvious sin as theft, murder, and prostitution—to its source and seek to eradicate it there, they will be forced at once into "practical politics." If they mean by the phrases "brothers in Christ" or "children of God" more than communicants of a particular faith they will be led, in their effort to attain a true brotherhood of man, to transform our industrial society. They will seek as their

object a greater equalization of property than exists at present, a high minimum wage, strict housing laws, and democratic control of the means of production—all those immediate and pressing needs which are the commonplaces of social reform. Sin, like disease, is largely a social product. Churches which war intelligently upon sin must lead in the revolution of a society which produces sin.

Furthermore the church must face honestly a new morality of the family and childbearing. The graveyards of New England are filled with the bodies of young mothers who died in childbirth, the third and fourth wives, often enough, of God-fearing Puritans. The church has preached from the text "increase and multiply." With Luther it has taught that women dying in childbirth were blessed in the fulfilment of a godly duty. It has urged the duty of having large families. What the lives of women have been under such instruction only doctors can tell. Twenty thousand women die yearly in the United States during childbirth, and the invalidism, insanity, and stunted lives which are another consequence of untimely motherhood are beyond computation. Much of this tragedy is unnecessary; yet only a few reformers—jailed for the dissemination of "immoral literature"—and a few scientists and leading doctors have thus far had the courage and public spirit to advocate the practise of birth control.

Yet everyone knows that birth control is widely practised by the better informed classes and that the result of this practise is not immorality but smaller families, more carefully nurtured, and mothers more physically fit and freed from the constant dread of inopportune pregnancy. Unless men are to continue to breed and perish like the brutes and unless overcrowded populations are to seek new lands by war and conquest or be periodically reduced by the plague, the practise of birth control must be universal in crowded and civilized states. Practised by moral people birth control is a moral act. But will the churches be among the first to spread this morality? Will clergymen give the weight of their influence to this vital reform? I have yet to hear of one such. Doubtless he would be harried from his charge. And yet if clergymen are to be moral leaders they must be prepared to be martyrs.

§ 3

The object of this brief discussion of the church in its relation to politics and an evolving morality has been to point out briefly the relation of morals to economic problems within the state and to the larger issue of democracy in international relations. It will be unfortunate if all the leaders of thought are to be other than church members, for the churches by reason of their organization and their traditional hold

upon mankind could, under enlightened leadership, vastly accelerate our social and moral progress. We may hope that a wave of religious feeling, the product of this war with its suffering and its spiritual lessons, may revivify the church and restore it to its proper place as a guiding moral force in the regeneration of society. But it is at best only a hope, not an expectation.

It is to a newer conception of God, one more in accord with modern science and philosophy than the traditional God of theology, that we turn most hopefully after speculating upon the ills of society and the means to their elimination. Only as we conceive of God not as a static first cause of a universe fated to grow upon predetermined lines, but as a creative spiritual force struggling to achieve a finer world, does human effort seem significant, worthy, and *hopeful* amid a hostile universe. Only then do we find consolation in man's conquests of nature and read in his faltering progress the augury of a happier future. Under such a God we are all brothers in imperfection but brothers too in the attainment of an incalculable perfection, whatever we have the courage and will to aspire to. It is not a predestined future. We make it for ourselves and our children, and the consciousness of our freedom is the first step to its attainment.

With this consciousness comes the immediate realization that only as purpose is unified and men domi-

nated by like ideals is rational and swift development possible. Amid the clash of individual ambitions and international hatreds and rivalries the perfected state in which man's conquest of nature is made the secure basis for the equal welfare of all has but a faint prospect of realization. Those things which divide men—rivalry, greed, faith in national destiny, the desire for power, pride in caste and creed, trade barriers—all these must no longer be justified by our moral code if men are to work together to achieve a better and freer world. Such an enlargement of our morality war both facilitates and retards. Our alliance wtih England, France and Russia has minimized many ancient antipathies. But it has created hatred of Germany and Austria. If, at the peace, we do not attempt to deal justly with our foes, discriminating between them as men like ourselves and the autocracy which they have permitted and which we feel endangers the peace of the world, the war will have been productive of evil. Perhaps no good can fully compensate the cost in any case. We can only do our best to pluck something of value from the wreck of so much that was good—from the lives of men and the work of their hands.

Essential to this effort to turn great evil to partial good is the recognition of our failure to achieve democracy and freedom and a resolution to do better. If we triumph in the war and emerge complacent and

self-righteous, achieving meanwhile a political and economic administration whose possibilities of evil and enslavement are as great as its possibilities of freedom, then we shall learn to our cost that the liberty for which we have fought and suffered is a mirage. New wars for liberty will need to be fought and the lesson which this war should teach us will need to be relearned and at great cost. An enlightened morality is the first essential, one that transcends class, creed, racial distrust, and a narrow patriotism. The new morality demands that the conduct of the individual and the group shall be governed by the desire so to act that the welfare of men the world over shall be enlarged thereby; not the welfare only of oneself, one's caste, or one's country, but the welfare of *all* men.

V

SOME PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

It has been the purpose of this book to make clear the need of domestic reforms if a world organization for the maintenance of peace is to persist. The democratization of the world demands that the various civilized peoples enlarge their conceptions of democracy and strive, by means of domestic institutions more subject than now to popular control and more expressive of popular aims, to attain such. The peace itself and its immediate terms must necessarily be something of a compromise. It can hardly realize completely the most liberal thought and aspiration of our day. At best it will be but a tentative essay, its terms serving as a basis for a firmer international organization than heretofore, one sufficing until the various contracting nations shall have achieved a truer democracy than now, and until the checks imposed upon the spirit of autocracy and militarism shall have demonstrated their fitness or unfitness to their end and their need of revision and supplement.

The conclusion of a peace will not, in a very real sense, end the war, for the war has passed far beyond its original aims. It is no longer merely a contest

between nations but a conflict between opposed ideals. It is the first and most violent stage of a revolution, of a battle between autocracy and democracy, of freedom and capitalism, of men and things. How long such a contest may persist no one dare prophesy. Its more violent manifestations may easily continue beyond our day, and something resembling the realization of our best ideals of social and political institutions may not be achieved in two generations. Freedom is not won at a blow nor perfection achieved by an act of will.

We face an uncertain era, one of which we may say ultimately, "Joy was it then to be alive"; for none of us is so obscure or so devoid of influence that he may not do his part in preparing the way for better things, for a finer order of life than is now possible in our money-making age with its selfish and material ambitions. We look forward to a time when participation in the comforts and leisure of life shall not be the privilege of a few but the lot of all; when the joy of genuinely creative work shall be experienced by every one; and when every boy and girl shall be fitted by education and opportunity to the best expression of his latent powers. Our civilization is wasteful of the powers of men, inhibiting them or perverting them to base uses. The revolution which is now gathering power has as its simple objective, I take it, the reorganization of society to the end that

men and women everywhere may have life more abundantly; that they may live in communities which do not repress or pervert their best potentialities but give these a fair field for growth and harvest.

We in the United States face, I believe, a more difficult task than that confronting any other of the great nations. We are largely inchoate. Many of our constituent groups lack leadership and a voice. We do not clearly realize our condition nor the problems which confront us. Cherishing in our innocence the belief that we are a free and democratic people, we are only now awakening to the realization that our democratic institutions are not adequate to their purposes, for we do not govern ourselves so fully as we should and must if we are to attain an industrial democracy. Wealth has undue power among us. A group relatively small in numbers but great in skill and influence constitutes our ruling class. The means by which it governs I have discussed in another chapter, and the program which we must follow if conditions are to be changed for the better. But what are the immediate political and social objects which we should pursue?

We can, I think, do no better than to turn our eyes towards England and take a leaf from her experience. England in her economic and social legislation has always anticipated us by a quarter or a half a century. Observe, notably, her experience

with labour-unionism, her factory acts, her industrial insurance, her old age pensions. And at the present time the carefully formulated program of her labour party should afford us an object lesson. The industrial evolution of England has been more rapid than that of the United States. But we can accelerate our pace if we will but look abroad and heed. In so doing we can obviate many conflicts and much suffering which would otherwise be inevitable in our industrial development.

Class consciousness in England is more alive than here; the means to its political expression is better perfected. We are still a prey to the awkward and undemocratic two party system which does not permit minority groups anything like a proportional voice in our domestic affairs. Our immediate reforms, then, such as are practicable in the near future and are a necessary prelude to a more thorough reorganization of our society, I take to be these:

1. A reform of our electoral machinery which shall permit minority representation in Congress.

2. The consequent abolition of the two party system and the substitution of the group system whereby labour shall find a voice in legislation.

3. The political union of agricultural and industrial labour and the formulation of a common program.

4. The alliance of the professional and intellectual

workers with the manual workers for the purpose of securing greater political power.

Of these I regard the last as the most important. It should provide the masses with leaders and a voice whereby other necessary changes may be realized. Organization, a program, a clear-eyed class consciousness are our immediate needs before we can proceed intelligently to reconstruct our political and economic order.

THE END

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
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